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Porter: A New Look

A New Look at the ADA’s Undue Hardship
Defense
Nicole Buonocore Porter*

I. INTRODUCTION
Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),1 employers are required to provide reasonable accommodations to qualified employees
with disabilities unless those accommodations would cause an undue hardship.2 Several issues arise from that one sentence. First, who has a disability?
Second, who is qualified? Third, what are reasonable accommodations and
when do they have to be provided? And finally, what is an undue hardship and
how is it defined? All but the last of these questions have received considerable
attention in the courts3 and in scholarly literature.4 The undue hardship issue
is the exception. Specifically, most of the scholarly work aimed at analyzing
the undue hardship provision was written around the time that the ADA was
first passed in 1990. In fact, the last article5 that explored the meaning of the
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development, University of Toledo College of Law. The author would like to thank participants at the
Ohio Legal Scholars Workshop at the University of Toledo College of Law for their
helpful feedback. Thanks also to Bryan Lammon, for everything.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12111–17 (2018).
2. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
3. See, e.g., U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); Toyota Motor
Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 (2009); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527
U.S. 555 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2009); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999),
superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat.
3553 (2009); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), superseded by
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2009);
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2009).
4. It would be impossible to cite to all of the literature written on these issues.
Instead, this is a list of disability scholars whose work on these (and many other) issues
has influenced me (in alphabetical order): Bradley A. Areheart, Samuel Bagenstos, Carlos A. Ball, Kevin M. Barry, Stephen Befort, Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., Ruth Colker, Jeannette Cox, Mary Crossley, Chai Feldblum, Harlan Hahn, Ann Hubbard, Christine Jolls,
Alex B. Long, Elizabeth Pendo, Jessica L. Roberts, Laura Rothstein, Ani B. Satz, Anita
Silvers, Michael Ashley Stein, Michelle Travis, Michael Waterstone, and Mark C. Weber. I apologize in advance if I forgot anyone.
5. This refers to a more in-depth analysis given in a full article written by a legal
academic. Most of the writing on the undue hardship provision was student-authored
notes and comments. Without denigrating those valuable pieces of scholarship, many
of which I cite to in other work, see generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, Cumulative
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undue hardship provision was written twenty-two years ago in 1995.6 This
Article attempts to fill that lengthy void.
This comprehensive investigation into the undue hardship provision is especially important at this point in the history of the ADA. The ADA was
passed in 1990 with overwhelming bipartisan support in Congress.7 Despite
this promising beginning, it was not long before federal courts began dramatically narrowing the class of individuals protected by the statute.8 For many
years, most ADA cases were dismissed at the summary judgment stage with
courts holding that the plaintiffs did not have a disability and therefore could
not proceed with the merits of their cases.9 As a result, there was not much
litigation involving the most important provision of Title I of the ADA—the
reasonable accommodation provision and its accompanying defense—the undue hardship defense. Congress was unhappy with the narrowed interpretation
of the ADA and consequently passed the ADA Amendments Act (“ADAAA”)
in 2008.10
The ADAAA dramatically expanded the definition of disability, and, as I
discuss in other work,11 courts have (for the most part) followed Congress’
mandate for an expanded protected class.12 This means that more cases have
proceeded and will continue to proceed past the issue of coverage (which focuses on whether the employee has a disability protected by the statute) and on
to the merits of the case, which often involve issues of reasonable accommodations.13 As more cases reach the issue of reasonable accommodation, there
are likely to be more cases reaching the issue of the defense to an employer’s
obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation—the undue hardship defense. To be clear, this Article is not limited to an analysis of undue hardship

Hardship, GEORGE MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3036619 [hereinafter Porter, Cumulative Hardship], articles written by legal
academics have the ability to explore issues in more depth and detail.
6. Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer’s Financial Hardship Becomes Undue, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391, 422–27 (1995).
7. See, e.g., RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 5–6 (2005); Alex B. Long, Introducing the
New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA Amendments
Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 217 (2008) (“[E]xpectations for the
[original] ADA [had been very] high.”).
8. E.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. 1,
8–11 (2014) [hereinafter Porter, Backlash]; see also Long, supra note 7, at 218.
9. See Long, supra note 7, at 228.
10. Porter, Backlash, supra note 8, at 4; see Long, supra note 7, at 217–18.
11. Porter, Backlash, supra note 8, at 3, 46–47.
12. Id; see also Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes
Under the ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2050–51 (2013).
13. See Porter, Backlash, supra note 8, at 4; Befort, supra note 12, at 2029; Jeannette Cox, Crossroads and Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 85 IND. L. J.
187, 204 (2010).
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cases that have been decided since the ADAAA went into effect. Instead, because we are in an era where more reasonable accommodation issues are being
litigated, I believe this is an especially important time to take a new look at the
undue hardship provision since the ADA’s enactment. This Article is mostly
a descriptive piece. I did not begin the project with any specific normative
goal, and this Article does not propose any reform in this area. Instead, my
goal was to simply take a closer look at how courts have been deciding issues
of undue hardship and to see if any trends or themes emerged.
For all of the years I have been teaching employment discrimination and
disability law (every year since 2004), I have frequently told my students that
the undue hardship provision is relatively irrelevant—that very few cases turn
on the undue hardship defense.14 When I began reviewing undue hardship
cases for other work,15 I was somewhat surprised that there were so many
cases.16 But upon further review of these cases, most of them are simply citing
the statutory provision and do not involve a discussion of the undue hardship
provision.17 Nevertheless, the cases that do discuss undue hardship provide
some interesting insights. This Article will not only summarize and attempt to
categorize the undue hardship cases but will also identify three trends that become apparent when engaging in a thorough analysis of this body of cases.
This Article will proceed in four additional parts. Part II will provide the
background of the undue hardship provision, including the statutory language
and its regulations, the legislative history, and the undue hardship cases decided under the precursor to the ADA—the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Part
III will delve into the undue hardship cases under the ADA. Even though most
people think about undue hardship as mostly involving financial cost, this Part
will reveal that relatively few cases turn on the actual costs of the accommodation. Part IV will identify three trends in the courts’ decisions that only became
apparent when I engaged in a deep dive of these cases: (1) courts often confuse
or conflate the reasonable accommodation inquiry and the undue hardship defense; (2) whether an accommodation places burdens on other employees (what
I call “special treatment stigma”) is frequently relevant to the undue hardship
defense; and (3) the phenomenon of “withdrawn accommodations” often influences courts’ analyses of the undue hardship defense. These themes not only
provide a deeper insight into the undue hardship defense but also help to more
broadly illuminate the scope of an employer’s obligation to provide reasonable
accommodations. Finally, Part V will conclude.

14. STEPHEN F. BEFORT & NICOLE BUONOCORE PORTER, DISABILITY LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 186 (West Academic 2016).
15. See generally Porter, Cumulative Hardship, supra note 5.
16. A Westlaw search (as of June 18, 2017) of “ADA /s ‘undue hardship’” resulted

in 1,997 results.
17. I identified only about 120 cases that actually engaged in an undue hardship
discussion rather than simply citing the statutory language.
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II. THE UNDUE HARDSHIP PROVISION
A. The Statute and Regulations
The ADA is considered an anti-discrimination statute, but it has two provisions18 that set it apart from other anti-discrimination statutes—primarily Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). 19 The first difference is
unlike Title VII, which protects all employees from discrimination based on
race, sex, color, religion, and national origin, the ADA has a much smaller
protected class.20 Plaintiffs have to prove that they have a disability, which is
defined as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities.21 The other primary difference is the ADA’s reasonable
accommodation provision.22
The ADA defines “discriminate” to include “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless
such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity . . . .”23
The “undue hardship” defense provides the outer limit of an employer’s obligation to provide reasonable accommodations under the ADA. It is defined in
the statute as “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth in subparagraph (B).”24
Subparagraph (B), in turn, provides the factors to be considered:
In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include –
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this
chapter;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and
resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon
the operation of the facility;

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Porter, Backlash, supra note 8, at 7–8.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2018).
Porter, Backlash, supra note 8, at 7.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
Porter, Backlash, supra note 8, at 8.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added).
Id. § 12111(10)(A).
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(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall
size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number
of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce
of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal
relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered
entity.25

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has provided some additional direction on the undue hardship provision.26 First, the
EEOC regulations suggest that an additional factor that should be considered
is “the impact on the ability of other employees to perform their duties and the
impact on the facility’s ability to conduct business.”27 The EEOC also issued
guidance, which states that an accommodation could impose an undue hardship
if it would “fundamentally alter the nature of the operation or business.”28 The
EEOC guidance also notes that an employer will not have an undue hardship
defense based on employees’ or customers’ fears or prejudices toward the individual with a disability. Similarly, undue hardship cannot be based on the
fact that providing a reasonable accommodation will have a “negative impact
on the morale of other employees.”29 However, employers might be able to
establish an undue hardship defense if an accommodation would be “unduly
disruptive to other employees’ ability to work.”30

B. Legislative History
Because there is relatively little case law under the undue hardship provision,31 it is helpful to examine the legislative history of the ADA to determine
what Congress thought the provision meant. As stated by one commentator,
“The undue hardship standard was one of the most controversial elements of
the ADA during its consideration in Congress.”32 Originally, the ADA called
for a higher standard than we currently have—an accommodation would have
25. Id. § 12111(10)(B).
26. See
generally EEOC,

ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT (2002), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html#N_114 [hereinafter EEOC Guidance].
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v) (2018).
28. EEOC Guidance, supra note 26.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See infra Section III.C.
32. Jeffrey O. Cooper, Comment, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The
Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1448 (1991).
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to threaten the continued existence of the employer’s business.33 Proponents
called it the “bankruptcy provision,” but it was subsequently altered to the
standard we have now in “the spirit of compromise.”34 Still, the legislative
history indicated that the undue hardship provision has a high bar. For instance,
Senator Lowell Weicker stated that the “costs associated with this bill are a
small price to pay for opening up our society to persons with disabilities.”35
We know that Congress intended the undue hardship standard to be
greater than the undue hardship defense under the religious accommodation
provision of Title VII, where anything more than a de minimis cost is considered an undue hardship.36 But we do not know too much more about defining
the specific standard that Congress intended.37 “One Congressman urged his
colleagues to develop a ‘concrete formula,’” and another insisted that businesses need some way of being able to predict what they are responsible for
when it comes to accommodating individuals with disabilities.38 Two attempts
to provide a more concrete formula failed. The first was to “limit [an employer’s] expenditures to five percent of annual net profit for businesses with
gross annual receipts of $500,000 or less.”39 This amendment failed by a large
margin.40 The other amendment proposed would have capped the cost of an
accommodation at ten percent of the disabled employee’s annual salary.41 This
amendment was rejected by a vote of 25-11 in the Senate and 213-187 in the
House.42
Here is what we do know from the legislative history. First, courts should
consider the net cost, not the gross cost when deciding if an accommodation
causes an undue hardship.43 So if an employer receives tax credits or other
benefits for the accommodation, these would offset the accommodation’s
cost.44 Second, “the court must take into account the number of employees,
presently and in the future, who will benefit from the proposed accommodation.”45 Thus, an accommodation that might cause an undue hardship if it will
33. Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Overview, 1989 U.
ILL. L. REV. 923, 927.
34. Id.
35. Epstein, supra note 6, at 422–23.
36. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II) (1990) (stating that the undue hardship
standard is a significantly higher standard than the one used in Hardison and that this
is “necessary in light of the crucial role that reasonable accommodation plays in ensuring meaningful employment opportunities for people with disabilities.”).
37. In fact, one scholar described it as a “standard so vague as to amount to no
standard at all.” Cooper, supra note 32, at 1450.
38. Epstein, supra note 6, at 426.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 426–27.
43. Cooper, supra note 32, at 1450; see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II).
44. See Cooper, supra note 32, at 1450.
45. Id. at 1451.
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only be used for one employee might not cause an undue hardship if it could
be shared by five employees with disabilities or if other employees might also
benefit from the accommodation.46 Third, courts need to distinguish costs to a
particular facility versus costs to the entity as a whole.47 As discussed above,
an accommodation can pose an undue hardship without threatening the existence of the employer’s business as a whole.48 But with respect to the undue
hardship in relationship to the particular facility, although Congress did not
want an entity to shut down a marginal facility rather than absorb the cost of
the proposed accommodation at that particular facility, Congress was apparently willing to place fairly high costs on an entity as long as a particular facility is not threatened with closure or job loss.49
We also know that Congress expected that the reasonable accommodation
provision would be a significant obligation. Some evidence of this includes
the fact that the legislative history referenced readers and interpreters several
times, both of which are very costly accommodations.50 The legislative history
also mentioned another expensive accommodation, personal attendants, stating
that whether or not a personal attendant hired to help a disabled employee when
traveling for work or with other job-related functions would constitute an undue hardship should be decided on a case-by-case basis.51

C. Undue Hardship Cases Under the Rehabilitation Act
Much of the early scholarship about the ADA was very critical of the
amorphousness of the undue hardship provision. The concern was that the
vagueness of the standard would lead to an abundance of litigation over the
meaning of the undue hardship provision. There was also significant concern
about the costs of complying with the reasonable accommodation provision,
given that the undue hardship definition—significant difficulty or expense—
seemed to create a fairly high bar.
For instance, one commentator stated that he believed the ADA was going
to be very costly for employers—costing as much as several billion dollars annually.52 Another commentator thought it was naïve for Congress to assume
that the accommodation mandate in the ADA would not be expensive; he was
responding to a Senate Report that noted the costs to do business were “expected to be less than $100 per worker for 30% of workers needing accommodations, with 51% of those needing an accommodation requiring no expense at

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id. at 1451.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1451–52.
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 101-116 (1989).
Id.
Gregory S. Crespi, Efficiency Rejected: Evaluating “Undue Hardship” Claims
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 26 TULSA L. J. 1, 4 (1990).
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all.”53 His response was that it was unrealistic to believe that the population of
unemployed individuals with disabilities would not need significant accommodations; thus, “although accommodation costs prior to the ADA may have been
‘no big deal,’ accommodation costs under the ADA—particularly for those disabled citizens pulled into the employment sector for the first time—may be a
very big deal indeed.”54
Steven Epstein also complained about the vagueness of the standard.55
His central thesis was that Congress should not have adopted such a vague
standard because it fails to inform covered entities and their employees with
disabilities of the nature of the employer’s obligations and the employees’
rights.56 He also argued that a vague standard will cause employers to feel
coerced into giving accommodations to avoid being wrong in litigation and that
it will create tense, if not hostile, relations between employers and employees.57
His argument was that it is unfair to impose liability on an employer for failure
to comply with an obligation that Congress consciously decided not to define
clearly.58 It was also unfair to require employers to spend money to obtain
clarity through the litigation process.59 Finally, it also put “job applicants and
employees in the awkward position of not knowing what accommodations they
can rightfully demand” from their employers.60
In response to arguments that the undue hardship provision is too vague
and undefinable, Congress pointed to cases that had been decided under the
predecessor to the ADA—Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.61 However,
several scholars complained that those cases did not provide a consistent standard.62 Others pointed out that there were not that many cases compared to the
number of cases that would get filed under the ADA.63 It seems to me that
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See Epstein, supra note 6, at 428–30.
Id. at 429–30.
See generally id.
Id. at 397.
Id.
Id. at 440–41.
Id.
Id. at 442.
See, e.g., Julie Brandfield, Note, Undue Hardship: Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 113, 114 (1990) (“ADA’s legislative history
states that federal agencies applying the reasonable accommodation and undue hardship
language should do so consistently with interpretations under the Rehabilitation Act.”);
Crespi, supra note 52, at 13 (discussing the intentions of the Senate Committee regarding the applicability of the Rehabilitation Act to ADA coverage).
62. See, e.g., Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act: How Much Must One Do Before Hardship Turns
Undue?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1311, 1334–36 (1991); Brandfield, supra note 61, at 114.
63. Epstein, supra note 6, at 433–34. There were “only 265 lawsuits filed under
the Rehabilitation Act from 1973–1990.” Id. After the ADA went into effect, approximately 30,000 charges were filed in the first two years, and approximately one-quarter
of those involved reasonable accommodation issues. Id. at 434. Epstein argues that
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some of the confusion derives from the fact that some of the Section 504 Rehabilitation Act cases are not employment cases,64 so the application of the
undue hardship factors does not translate as well to employment cases.65 The
other problem is that these cases involve large public, or quasi-public, employers whose budgets were comprised in large part of revenue collected from taxpayers. Gleaning anything from these cases when applied to private employers
is difficult.66 Thus, the question remains whether these cases actually helped
clarify the standard. The answer, I am afraid, is “not much.”
In one of the most frequently cited cases under the Rehabilitation Act,
Nelson v. Thornburgh,67 three blind income maintenance workers with Pennsylvania’s Department of Public Welfare (“DPW”) requested their employer to
provide them readers to allow them to perform their jobs.68 Because their jobs
entailed extensive paperwork, they had to use readers on a part-time basis.69
The plaintiffs had originally hired and paid for the readers themselves.70 But
in their lawsuit, they claimed that the defendant’s refusal to accommodate them
by providing readers or some other mechanical device to allow them to read
was discrimination within the meaning of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.71 The defendant argued that the cost of the readers or mechanical devices
would be an undue hardship.72 In exploring the cost of the readers, the court
noted that the provision of a full-time reader is not necessary because the workers could conduct the determination and redetermination interviews without the
reader and then use the reader to prepare the forms required.73 Thus, a reader
was only necessary for four hours per day or less.74 During the rest of the day,
a person capable of serving as a reader could be on call.75 At the time, the type
those 265 cases “could not possibly have provided a large enough database to sufficiently clarify an issue” that is litigated much more under the ADA, especially considering that only a handful of the cases addressed whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship and only two focused on financial costs. Id.
64. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act applies to all programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2018).
65. See, e.g., Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982) (addressing
undue hardship in a case regarding public transit); Am. Pub. Transit Ass’n v. Lewis,
655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (dealing with the issue of whether the Department of
Transportation regulations implementing Section 504 in the public transit context were
valid); R.I. Handicapped Action Comm. v. R.I. Pub. Transit Auth., 549 F. Supp. 592
(D.R.I. 1982) (addressing undue hardship in a case regarding public transit), rev’d in
part, vacated in part 718 F.2d 490 (1st Cir. 1983).
66. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 437–39.
67. 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff’d, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984).
68. Id. at 370.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 370–71.
72. Id. at 371.
73. Id. at 376.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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of clerk that performed the job as a reader earned $13,276 per year.76 The court
reasoned that because the plaintiffs could perform the essential functions of
their job if they were each supplied with a half-time reader, the cost of accommodation would be approximately half of the salary of the clerk, or $6,638 per
year, for each plaintiff.77
In determining whether this accommodation constituted an undue hardship for the defendant, the court reviewed the factors promulgated in the implementing regulations for the Rehabilitation Act. Those factors are very similar to the factors we currently have under the ADA: “(1) the overall size of the
recipient’s program with respect to number of employees, number and type of
facilities, and size of budget; (2) the type of the recipient’s operation, including
the composition and structure of the recipient’s workforce; and (3) the nature
and cost of the accommodation needed.”78 The court also cited to the illustrations in the Appendix to the regulations:
The weight given to each of these factors in making the determination
as to whether an accommodation constitutes undue hardship will vary
depending on the facts of a particular situation. Thus, a small day-care
center might not be required to expend more than a nominal sum, such
as that necessary to equip a telephone for use by a secretary with impaired hearing, but a large school district might be required to make
available a teacher’s aide to a blind applicant for a teaching job. Further, it might be considered reasonable to require a state welfare agency
to accommodate a deaf employee by providing an interpreter while it
would constitute an undue hardship to impose that requirement on a
provider of foster home care services. 79

Applying these regulations, the court held, in light of the defendant’s
$300 million administrative budget, the “modest cost of providing half-time
readers, and the ease of adopting that accommodation without any disruption
of DPW’s services, [makes] it . . . apparent that DPW has not met its burden of
showing undue hardship.”80 This case is frequently cited as one where the relatively significant costs of accommodation did not cause an undue hardship.81
In Arneson v. Sullivan,82 the plaintiff was an employee at a social security
administration (“SSA”) office. He had a neurological disorder called apraxia
that caused him difficulty bringing ideas together and writing; he was easily
distracted, and he had difficulty with some motor skills.83 He especially had
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 379–80 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c)(1-3)).
Id. at 380 (quoting 45 C.F.R app. § 84).
Id.
See e.g., William S. Colwell, Accommodating the Handicapped Federal Employee, 35 A.F. L. REV. 69, 77–78 (1991).
82. 946 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1991).
83. Id. at 91.
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trouble concentrating in noisy, stressful environments.84 He performed satisfactorily in one location, where he had a semi-private office space, but once he
was transferred to a different location, he began to have trouble performing.85
The employer terminated him for alleged performance difficulties.86 Arneson
sued, and in his lawsuit he argued that he could have performed his job adequately with the following accommodations: “(1) a telephone headset to free
his hands; (2) a quiet workspace to minimize his distractibility; and (3) clerical
assistance to check his work.”87 Although the employer agreed to the first request, it claimed it could not find him a quiet workspace and that providing
clerical assistance would mean it would have to hire another employee capable
of doing his job, which would be the equivalent of hiring two people to perform
one job.88 The employer argued that these accommodations were not reasonable and would cause an undue hardship, and the district court agreed.89
In the first opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
the court disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that the employer had
offered the plaintiff reasonable accommodations and that the plaintiff was not
qualified.90 The court stated that the district court had not given enough attention to the possibility of transferring plaintiff back to his original location
where he had a semi-private workspace or providing him some clerical assistance.91 The court stated that it did not appear that these options were adequately examined in an effort to determine the cost of such accommodations
and the impact they would have on the employer’s operation.92 As the court
stated:
[F]urther development is necessary to ascertain what duties this assistant would have to perform in order to have some impact on Arneson’s
job performance, what the cost of such an assistant would be and
whether additional funding may be available to offset the cost to the
SSA. Obviously, it is beyond the expectations of the Rehabilitation Act
that the SSA be required to hire another person capable of actually performing Arneson’s job. On the other hand, Arneson claims that he
would only need someone to proofread his work and that this person
would only need to know how to read. And, presumably, the necessary

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1989), remanded No. 84–

2552–C(3), 1990 WL 116658 (E.D. Mo. 1990), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.
Arneson v. Sullivan, 946 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1991).
87. Id. at 397.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 397–98.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 397.
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proofreading could be accomplished by a part-time worker, such as a
college student.93

The court also stated: “We strongly feel that the federal government
should be a model employer of the handicapped and should be required to make
whatever reasonable accommodations are available.”94 The court remanded
the case back to the district court, and the district court again rendered judgment for the defendant.95
In the Eighth Circuit’s second opinion, the court again reversed the district court, concluding that Arneson was qualified and that the SSA refused to
make reasonable accommodations as required by law.96 Specifically, the court
noted that “very little was done to attempt to accommodate Arneson and to,
thus, preserve him as a contributing employee of the SSA.”97 The court further
noted that Arneson was “on disability, receiving a government pension when
he c[ould] very likely adequately perform services as a social security claims
representative.”98 The court also noted that the duties of the claim representative had by then been automated, thus negating the need for a clerical assistant.99 With regard to the distraction-reduced workspace, the court noted that
the SSA never looked into providing a private work space at the new location
and that no one had demonstrated how much it would cost.100 Thus, the court
reversed the district court and remanded, directing the district court to enter an
order reinstating Arneson, giving him computer training on the new system,
and requiring the department to spend a reasonable amount to provide him a
distraction-free environment.101 The court also awarded back pay.102 Perhaps
surprisingly, the court also directed that, if necessary, Arneson be given a
“reader.”103 The court noted that this did not need to be someone “who [wa]s
an alternate claims representative, only an individual who, upon reading the
paper printed by the computer at the work station, c[ould] assist Arneson in his
efforts to satisfactorily complete his assigned tasks.”104
The above cases are ones where the court set a fairly high bar for the
employer to prove undue hardship. But there were other Rehabilitation Act

93. Id. at 397–98.
94. Id. at 398.
95. Id.; Arneson v. Heckler, No. 84–2552–C(3), 1990 WL 116658, at *6 (E.D.

Mo. 1990), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Arneson v. Sullivan, 946 F.2d 90 (8th
Cir. 1991).
96. Id. at 91.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 92.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 92–93.
103. Id. at 93.
104. Id.
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cases where the courts did not require expensive, burdensome accommodations. For instance, in Gardner v. Morris,105 the plaintiff was a civil engineer
with the United States Army Corps of Engineers ( “Corps”) and was diagnosed
as a manic depressive.106 His application for promotion and transfer to Saudi
Arabia was rejected because the “medical facilities in Saudi Arabia were not
capable of accommodating the plaintiff’s condition” and the “nearest competent physician was a one-hour flight, or a thirteen-hour drive[,] away.”107 The
court concluded that the only accommodation would have been for the Corps
to set up a medical facility in Saudi Arabia sufficient to treat the plaintiff’s
condition and that this accommodation would impose an undue hardship.108
Similarly, in Treadwell v. Alexander, the plaintiff, a retired Air Force
colonel, applied with the Corps as a seasonal park technician.109 He had been
previously rated by the Veteran’s Administration as 100% disabled due to a
nervous condition and a heart condition and was denied the position because
the Corps believed he was not qualified due to his disabilities.110 The district
court concluded that it would have been necessary for the Corps to require other
park technicians to perform many of the plaintiff’s duties if he had been
hired.111 The appellate court stated that because “only two to four other workers [were] available at any given time to patrol the 150,000 acres [of the park,]
and in light of the agency’s limited resources,” requiring other workers to perform some of plaintiff’s duties would impose an “undue hardship” on the
Corps.112 The appellate court agreed with the district court that the defendant
had established its undue hardship defense.113

III. UNDUE HARDSHIP CASES UNDER THE ADA
Despite the concern expressed in early scholarship that the vagueness of
the undue hardship provision would lead to a great deal of litigation, the reality
is that the undue hardship defense is very rarely outcome determinative. This
Part does not try to discuss or even cite to every undue hardship case under the
ADA. Instead, its goal is to categorize the cases based on the facts that are
alleged to create an undue hardship.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

752 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1985).
Epstein, supra note 6, at 419.
Id.
Id.
707 F.2d 473, 474 (11th Cir. 1983).
Id.
Id. at 478.
Id.
Id.
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A. The Early Cases
There were three cases decided in the early days of the ADA that provided
some guidance on the undue hardship provision but mostly discussed the burdens of proof and the relationship between the undue hardship defense and the
reasonable accommodation provision. Even though none of these cases specifically discussed the issue of “how much is too much,” they do provide some
guidance on what early courts were thinking with respect to the undue hardship
defense.
The first and one of the most-cited ADA cases is Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department of Administration.114 This case is most known for its statement
regarding how to determine whether an accommodation is “reasonable”—by
using a cost-benefit approach.115 The court stated:
It would not follow that the costs and benefits of altering a workplace
to enable a disabled person to work would always have to be quantified,
or even that an accommodation would have to be deemed unreasonable
if the cost exceeded the benefit however slightly. But at the very least,
the cost could not be disproportionate to the benefit. 116

The court’s reasoning for so defining the reasonable accommodation provision was its concern that the undue hardship provision would make it difficult
for an employer to raise a cost-based defense to an accommodation, especially
if the employer is large or, like the employer in Vande Zande, a government
employer.117 The court stated:
Even if an employer is so large or wealthy—or, like the principal defendant in this case, is a state, which can raise taxes in order to finance
any accommodations that it must make to disabled employees—that it
may not be able to plead “undue hardship,” it would not be required to
expend enormous sums in order to bring about a trivial improvement in
the life of a disabled employee. If the nation’s employers have potentially unlimited financial obligations to [forty-three] million disabled
persons, the [ADA] will have imposed an indirect tax potentially greater

114. 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995). Westlaw reveals that, as of December 26, 2018,
there are 2,594 citing references to this case. This opinion was authored by well-known
Judge Posner, and Judge Easterbrook was also on the panel. I am certain that this contributed to the case’s popularity.
115. Id. at 542 (stating that the word “reasonable” weakens the word “accommodation” “in just the same way that if one requires a ‘reasonable effort’ of someone this
means less than the maximum possible effort”).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 542–43.
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than the national debt. We do not find an intention to bring about such
a radical result in either the language of the A[DA] or its history. 118

Then, in trying to determine how to define “undue hardship,” the court
stated that undue hardship is a term of relation: “We must ask, ‘undue’ in relation to what? Presumably (given the statutory definition and the legislative
history) in relation to the benefits of the accommodation to the disabled worker
as well as to the employer’s resources.”119 Thus, putting this all together, the
court stated that costs should be considered at two points in the reasonable accommodation analysis.120 According to the court, the “employee must show
that the accommodation is reasonable in the sense” that it is both effective and
proportional to costs.121 Even if this showing is made, “the employer has an
opportunity to prove that upon more careful consideration the costs are excessive in relation either to the benefits of the accommodation or to the employer’s
financial survival or health.”122
Applying its cost-benefit approach to one of the accommodations requested, which was a lower sink in the kitchenette so that the plaintiff (who
was a paraplegic) could reach it from her wheelchair, the court stated that even
though it would have cost only $150 to lower the sink, given the proximity of
the bathroom sink,
we do not think an employer has a duty to expend even modest amounts
of money to bring about an absolute identity in working conditions between disabled and nondisabled workers. The creation of such a duty
would be the inevitable consequence of deeming a failure to achieve
identical conditions “stigmatizing.” That is merely an epithet. We conclude that access to a particular sink, when access to an equivalent sink,
conveniently located, is provided, is not a legal duty of an employer.
The duty of reasonable accommodation is satisfied when the employer
does what is necessary to enable the disabled worker to work in reasonable comfort.123

The second case (chronologically) is actually a case brought under the
Rehabilitation Act, but it was decided in 1995, shortly after the ADA went into
effect, and it is frequently cited in other ADA reasonable accommodation and
undue hardship cases.124 In Borkowski v. Valley Central School District,125 the

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 543.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Roberts v. Royal Atlantic Corp., 542 F. 3d 363, 370–71 (2d Cir.
2008); Jackan v. N.Y. State Dep’t. of Labor, 205 F. 3d 562, 566–67 (2d Cir. 2000).
125. 63 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1995).
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plaintiff was a library teacher who served at two elementary schools. In addition to her duties in the library, “she was responsible for teaching library skills
to classes of elementary school students.”126 She suffered major head trauma
and serious neurological damage, which caused difficulties with memory and
concentration, and she had trouble dealing with simultaneous stimuli.127 An
unannounced visit to one of her classes found her having difficulty controlling
the class—“students had talked, yelled, and whistled without being corrected.”128 The school district denied her tenure.129
The court was tasked with determining the appropriate burdens of proof
when deciding reasonable accommodation and undue hardship issues. The
court held that the plaintiff bears the burden of production and persuasion on
the issue of whether she is qualified for the job in question, which includes
whether there is an accommodation that would permit her to perform the job’s
essential functions.130 As for how costs come into play, the court held that “an
accommodation is only reasonable if its costs are not clearly disproportionate
to the benefits it will produce.”131 Plaintiff’s burden with respect to reasonable
accommodation is one of production—she must “suggest the existence of a
plausible accommodation, the costs of which, facially, do not clearly exceed
its benefits.”132 Then the defendant has the burden of showing that the accommodation is unreasonable and that burden merges with its ultimate burden of
showing that the accommodation would cause an undue hardship.133
The court then undertook a more specific undue hardship analysis, attempting to analyze the undue hardship factors.134 But the court stated that the
factors do not tell us much because certainly “Congress could not have intended that the only limit on the employer’s duty to make reasonable accommodation to be the full extent of the tax base on which the government entity
c[an] draw.”135 Thus, the court stated that undue hardship is a relational term,
where we have to look at not only the costs to the employer but also the benefits
to others that will result.136 However, the court also stated that there is no
complex formula and instead courts should undertake a common-sense balancing of the costs and benefits.137
The way I read this language is that the court in Borkowski is intimating
that the obligation to provide an accommodation is not very great or significant.
But in deciding the issue of whether the plaintiff should be allowed a teacher’s
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 137–38.
Id. at 138.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 139.
Id.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 140.
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aide to assist her in managing the classroom as a reasonable accommodation,
the court stated there was not enough evidence of undue hardship to decide the
issue on summary judgment.138 Specifically, the court stated that the school
district did not present evidence concerning the cost of providing a teacher’s
aide or the school district’s budget, among other things.139 The court also noted
that the regulations to the Rehabilitation Act contemplate that employers might
be required to assume the cost of providing an aide absent a showing that the
cost is excessive in light of the factors.140
The third case is a district court case, which is included here because it
was an early case that involved a significant discussion about the meaning of
the undue hardship provision.141 In Bryant v. Better Business Bureau [“BBB”]
of Greater Maryland, Inc., the plaintiff suffered from some (but not complete)
hearing loss.142 She requested and received a transfer to the membership coordinator position from the administrative position she had been serving in at
BBB.143 As part of that new job, she had to staff a hotline number and had
difficulty hearing the addresses and telephone numbers of the callers with the
amplification device she was accustomed to using.144 She requested a text telephone (“TTY”) device that would allow her to communicate by way of an
operator typing the conversation of the caller and then Bryant simply speaking
back to the caller (she had no difficulty with speech).145 The cost of the TTY
device was a one-time expense of $279.146 BBB denied her request, stating
that it would cause an undue hardship.147
The court’s analysis of the undue hardship defense was a bit different
from other courts. The court first noted that several courts “have treated ‘reasonable accommodations’ and ‘undue hardship’ as flip sides of the same coin,”
meaning that an accommodation that is reasonable would not cause an undue
hardship and an accommodation that is unreasonable would cause an undue
hardship.148 But as the court noted, “several courts have held . . . that an accommodation could be ‘reasonable’ and still cause an ‘undue hardship.’”149
The court agreed with these latter courts and argued that material differences
exist between inquiries about whether an accommodation is reasonable and
whether the accommodation would cause an excessive or undue hardship on
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 142–43.
Id.
Id. at 142.
In full disclosure, I also chose this case for the disability law casebook that I
co-authored with Steve Befort. See BEFORT & PORTER, supra note 14, at 187.
142. Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Md., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 720, 727 (D.
Md. 1996).
143. Id. at 730.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 730.
147. Id. at 731.
148. Id. at 733. See infra Section IV.A for a more thorough discussion of this issue.
149. Id. at 734.
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the employer.150 Thus, reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are not,
according to the court in Bryant, flip sides of the same coin.151
Instead, the reasonable accommodation inquiry asks whether the accommodation would be effective and would allow the employee to attain an equal
level of achievement, opportunity, and participation that a nondisabled individual would be able to achieve.152 The undue hardship defense focuses on the
impact that the accommodation would have on the specific employer at a particular time.153 This is, according to the court, “a multi-faceted, fact-sensitive
inquiry requiring consideration of: (1) financial cost; (2) additional administrative burdens; (3) complexity of implementation; and (4) any negative impact
that the accommodation may have on the operation of the business, including
the effect of the accommodation on the employer’s workforce.”154
BBB argued that it had denied the TTY device based on a determination
that it “‘would slow down the operation of’ the membership coordinator.”155
The employer argued it was worried about the volume of calls it would receive
if it implemented a 900 number as planned.156 But when pressed at his deposition, the supervisor said that cost was not a factor; instead, he testified that it
was not the speed with which she could handle the calls; it was the accuracy.157
The employer also provided the testimony of an expert witness who testified
that “BBB’s members’ awkwardness and unfamiliarity with the system would
cause the members who called BBB ‘an undue hardship.’”158
The court stated that these reasons did not comport with the statutory and
regulatory scheme of the ADA. The argument that the TTY device would have
slowed down the plaintiff focused on the reasonableness of the accommodation, not the burden on the employer.159 The court also stated that the defendant’s argument of imagined awkwardness and unfamiliarity of BBB’s members
with the system was “not only inappropriate and patronizing but offensive.”160
Even assuming that the system was “awkward and unfamiliar,” the court noted
that no suggestion had been made as to how that would have negatively affected the business.161 The court held that the defendant’s assumption of an
adverse impact on the business was based on “little more than preconceived

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 736.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 738.
Id.
Id. at 738.
Id. at 739.
Id.
Id. at 740.
Id.
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discriminatory stereotypes, which are the targets of the ADA in the first
place.”162 Thus, the defendant’s undue hardship argument failed.163
Although these cases help us understand the burdens of proof in reasonable accommodation cases, they do little to give us a sense of predicting the cost
question: How much is too much? Cases decided after these early cases do not
shed too much light on the subject but are still worth analyzing.

B. Cases Where Financial Cost Was an Issue
Of all the undue hardship cases I identified and read, only sixteen of them
actually discussed costs.164 And in one of these cases, the undue hardship analysis was dicta because the case could have been decided on other grounds. In
Balls v. AT&T Corp., the plaintiff had carpal tunnel syndrome, and her job
required typing at least forty-five words per minute; but according to the plaintiff, often typing seventy to eighty words per minute was necessary.165 The
accommodation she requested was to use voice-activated technology instead
of typing.166 Because the evidence revealed that voice-activated technology
would cost twelve million dollars, the court held that it would be an undue
hardship.167 Despite its undue hardship discussion, the court also held that the
plaintiff did not have a disability, which justified dismissing the plaintiff’s
case.168
Even when courts hold that the employer did not prove undue hardship,
the procedural posture of these cases is such that the plaintiffs are not winning
their claims—they are simply surviving to litigate another day, i.e., surviving
the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. In most of the cases, the court
simply stated that the defendant had not provided enough information to support the undue hardship defense.169

162. Id. at 740.
163. Id. at 741.
164. As mentioned earlier, I identified 1,997 cases that mentioned “undue hardship”

in the context of an ADA case. See supra note 16. However, of those, I identified only
about 120 of them that actually engaged in an undue hardship discussion (rather than
simply citing the statutory language). See supra note 17.
165. 28 F. Supp. 2d 970, 972 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
166. Id. at 973–74.
167. Id. at 974.
168. Id. at 974–75.
169. See, e.g., Rodal v. Anesthesia Grp. of Onondoga, 369 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir.
2004) (holding that the employer had not proven that the costs of accommodating the
plaintiff’s scheduling needs causes an undue burden because the defendant presented
no evidence of the financial impact of the accommodation, including no evidence of
their financial resources or the costs of the accommodation); Reilly v. Upper Darby
Twp., 809 F. Supp. 2d 368, 383–84 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (stating that the question of whether
the cost the police department would incur from allowing the plaintiff to perform nonpatrol duties would pose an undue hardship is a question for the jury).
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For instance, in Alabi v. Atlanta Public Schools, the plaintiff was a school
teacher with a hearing disability.170 He requested a full-time interpreter to communicate in the classroom.171 The employer argued that this would cost too
much money because the teacher needed a very skilled sign language interpreter (presumably because of the subject matter).172 The employer cited the
cost of the interpreter as being $62 per hour or $85,000 for the school year,
which it claimed would be an undue financial hardship, especially given that
the cost was disproportionate to the plaintiff’s yearly salary of $53,000.173 The
court recognized that the cost seemed high but ultimately held that the defendant did not produce sufficient evidence to establish undue hardship.174 The
court reasoned that there was no evidence the school district had attempted to
negotiate this rate or see if it could reassign another interpreter from within the
school district.175 The employer also lacked evidence of the impact of the potential translation fees on the school district’s fiscal operation or resources.176
In another sign language interpreter case, Searls v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, the plaintiff was a deaf woman with a nursing degree.177 When she was
offered a nursing job, she requested an interpreter.178 The evidence revealed
that the cost of providing an interpreter proficient in medical terminology
would be between $40,000 and $60,000 and that she would require two interpreters with her at all times for an annual cost of $240,000.179 The hospital
ultimately determined that it was too expensive to accommodate her and rescinded her offer.180 When the court discussed the employer’s undue hardship
defense, it noted that the defendant had only focused on the resources and operations of the specific unit for which she would be hired, ignoring the question
of how providing an interpreter costing $120,000, or 0.007% of the entire operational budget of $1.7 billion, could impose an undue hardship.181 The employer was basically arguing that it had no money in the budget allocated for
reasonable accommodations. The court (sensibly in my opinion) held that the
employer’s budget for reasonable accommodations is an irrelevant factor in
assessing undue hardship because allowing an employer to prevail on its undue
hardship defense based on its own budgeting decisions would effectively cede

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

No. 1:12–CV–0191–AT, 2011 WL 11785485, *1 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2011).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *6–8.
Id. at *10.
Id.
Id.
158 F. Supp. 3d 427, 430 (D. Md. 2016).
Id. at 431.
Id. It is not clear why she would need two interpreters with her at all times,
and even if she does, it is not clear how the defendant arrived at the $240,000 figure.
The court used the figure of $120,000. Id. at 438.
180. Id. at 433.
181. Id. at 438.
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the legal determination on this issue to the employer.182 Finally, the court
stated that it is irrelevant that the cost of the interpreter would be twice the
salary of the plaintiff.183
The size and financial resources of the employer was very relevant in
these cases. While the court was not willing in the above case (Searls) to find
an undue hardship for a full-time interpreter, in another case involving a nonprofit organization, the court stated that it was an issue of fact regarding
whether a sign language interpreter for all staff meetings (but presumably not
the rest of the time) was an undue hardship.184
In Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store of Delaware, the court also held
that the question of undue hardship is a question of fact for the jury.185 This
case involved the issue of whether the defendant violated the ADA by discriminating in the provision of health benefits.186 The plaintiff had cancer and was
diagnosed with AIDS.187 Accordingly, the cost of the employer’s health insurance plan increased.188 Because of these increased costs, the employer
switched to a new insurance company that refused to cover the plaintiff.189 In
discussing the undue hardship issue, the court stated:
The ADA explicitly recognizes that integrating disabled individuals
into the workforce often will result in increased costs. Increased costs
are thought to be the price we as a people must pay for equal dignity.
There comes a point, however, where enormous expense involved in
providing equal terms of employment to an otherwise qualified individual may result in an undue burden for a covered entity. The ADA takes
account of these rare situations where an accommodation may be financially crippling . . . .190

In the context of health insurance, the court pointed to the EEOC guidelines, which “state that an [e]mployer must prove that coverage for a discrete
group of disabilities would be so expensive as to cause the employer’s plan to
become financially insolvent. The employer must also [demonstrate] that there
is no alternative that would avoid the insolvency.” 191 Thus, the court denied

182. Id. at 438–39.
183. Id. at 439.
184. EEOC v. Placer ARC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1053, 1058–59 (E.D. Cal. 2015)

(finding that the extent to which an interpreter is needed and the costs of providing one
were speculative).
185. 924 F. Supp. 763, 781 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
186. Id. at 768.
187. Id. at 769.
188. Id. at 871.
189. Id. at 770.
190. Id. at 780.
191. Id. at 781.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

21

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 8

142

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

the employer’s motion for summary judgment, claiming this issue was a question of fact for the jury.192
Similarly, in Kane v. Carmel Central School District, the plaintiff was a
middle school music teacher who had multiple sclerosis, which required her to
use a wheelchair.193 The defendant school district provided some accommodations to her but refused others, claiming the cost was too high.194 For instance, the defendant estimated that installing a power-assist door and constructing a ramp would be $20,000 and $30,000.195 The court criticized the
defendant for not researching the costs of any of these accommodations and for
not considering anything but the cost.196 For instance, the school district did
not consider its overall budget, whether the budget could accommodate this
request, or the overall benefits of providing the accommodations.197 Thus, the
court held that it could not conclude as a matter of law that the plaintiff’s proposed accommodations would cause an undue hardship.198
In some cases, the cost seemed pretty low and yet the employer still argued undue hardship. For instance, in McGregor v. United Healthcare Services, Inc., the court rejected the employer’s undue hardship argument and held
that the $2,375 that it would cost to install an automatic door opener for the
plaintiff, whose used a wheelchair, was not an undue burden.199 In another
case, the court held that providing a sign language interpreter for one meeting
where the plaintiff (who was deaf) was being investigated for theft did not
cause an undue hardship because the benefit of having the interpreter outweighed the limited costs.200
Sometimes courts do not have the opportunity to analyze the “how much
is too much” question because the parties are disputing what the costs actually
are. For instance, in Garza v. Abbott Laboratories, the parties disputed the cost
of the voice-activated software that the plaintiff needed to perform her duties
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
No. 12 CV 5429(VB), 2014 WL 7389438, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2014).
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id. at *8; cf. Picinich v. United Parcel Serv., 321 F. Supp. 2d 485, 507–08
(N.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that UPS claimed undue hardship for the cost of having to
search for a position that the plaintiff could perform with his disability related restrictions but did not submit evidence of its overall financial resources in order to allow
a meaningful consideration of the undue hardship defense).
199. No. H–09–2340, 2010 WL 3082293, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2010).
200. Mohamed v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 141, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). This
case was unusual because the hotel employed about fifty deaf employees, receiving
substantial tax advantages for doing so, and therefore the defendant was accustomed to
having interpreters on staff. See id. at 146. The problem in this case was that there was
no interpreter for the first investigatory meeting after they accused the plaintiff of stealing, and this caused the plaintiff to be unable to adequately defend himself against the
theft accusation. Id. at 151.
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after an arm condition restricted her ability to comfortably type on a keyboard.201 The employer’s estimate for providing that software was $1 million
as well as additional costs for significant programming to get the software to
work.202 However, the plaintiff’s expert estimated the cost at $9,500.203 One
interesting issue that arose was that the employer tried to argue that as long as
it made its cost “estimate in good faith, it does not matter whether the estimate
was objectively wrong.”204 The court, however, disagreed with the employer,
stating that the undue hardship inquiry is an objective one and that because
there was a dispute over the costs, it should be a fact issue for the jury.205
Similarly, in Reyazuddin v. Montgomery County, the county-employer
opened a new call center that used software that was inaccessible for blind employees.206 Thus, because the plaintiff was blind, the employer did not transfer
her to the new call center with her sighted coworkers.207 The estimates of the
cost to make this software accessible varied widely from $129,600 to
$648,000.208 The court compared this to the county’s total budget of $3.73
billion per year and to the call center’s budget of $4 million per year. 209 The
court reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant,
stating that the district court had improperly weighed conflicting evidence and
did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.210 Similar
to the Searls case discussed above, the court also disagreed with the district
court’s reliance on the fact that the county’s budget had only a $15,000 line
item for accommodations.211 The court stated:
Allowing the County to prevail on its undue hardship defense based on
its own budgeting decisions would effectively cede the legal determination on this issue to the employer that allegedly failed to accommodate an employee with a disability. Taken to its logical extreme, the
employer could budget $0 for reasonable accommodations and thereby
always avoid liability. The County’s overall budget ($3.73 billion in
fiscal year 2010) and [the call center’s] operating budget (about $4 million) are relevant factors. But the County’s line-item budget for reasonable accommodations is not.212

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

940 F. Supp. 1227, 1229–31 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
Id. at 1240.
Id. at 1241.
Id.
Id. at 1243.
789 F.3d 407, 409 (4th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id. at 412.
Id.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 418 (citations omitted). The court also stated that costs cannot be viewed
in isolation; it is the relative costs that should be considered. Id.
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Interestingly, of the sixteen cases I identified where the court based its
decision on costs, only one granted an employer’s motion for summary judgment based on the undue hardship defense. In D’Eredita v. ITT Corp., the
plaintiff worked in a commercial facility and “committed numerous fabrication
errors that led to an extensive disciplinary record” before he was diagnosed
with mild dyslexia.213 His job required him to read designs and use scales,
gauges, and similar instruments.214 He had difficulty with all of these tasks,
causing him to be laid off and unable to successfully bid on another job.215 The
two accommodations he requested were to have additional employees added to
his line and to have the motors he used color coded.216 The court held that both
accommodations would unduly burden the employer.217 The first accommodation, involving extra employees, would cause the employer to assume superfluous labor expense, which would interfere with the employer’s desired profit
margins.218 The second accommodation would also impose an undue hardship
on the employer because color coordinating the manufacturing process would
involve fifty different types of complex motors of varying types, which would
be unduly burdensome and expensive.219 Interestingly, however, the employer
never identified the specific costs, and unlike other cases, the court did not
require the employer to identify the specific costs.220
Despite this last case, my take-away from this group of cases is as follows:
When the issue is truly one of direct costs (as opposed to indirect costs of additional supervision or restructuring job tasks, etc.), courts seem to be willing
to carefully analyze the undue hardship factors in the statute and require the
employer to prove why the accommodation would be costly enough to reach
that relatively high bar for proving undue hardship.

C. Restructuring Job Tasks
The cases I have placed in this category generally did not reference costs
at all. Instead, these are cases where the plaintiff’s requested accommodation
involved restructuring of job tasks and the employer argued undue hardship not
because of the cost of the accommodation but because accommodating the
plaintiff would be difficult or unworkable. Similar to the category above, for
some of these cases, the undue hardship issue was not dispositive because the
court could have dismissed the case for some other reason (often because the

213. No. 11–CV–6575–CJS–MWP, 2015 WL 6801828, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 5,

2015).
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *8.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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individual did not meet the statutory definition of disability).221 But for some
of them, the employer’s failure to prove undue hardship was the reason the case
was not dismissed, and the plaintiff’s claim survived the employer’s motion
for summary judgment.222
For instance, in Carmichael v. Verso Paper, LLC, the plaintiff had several
work injuries that caused physical restrictions, including lifting limitations and
limitations on the repetitive use of his arms.223 The employer argued that his
requested accommodation, taking breaks when needed, was a hardship to the
employer because it limited the plaintiff’s work capacity.224 The court stated
that the employer had not proven why plaintiff’s position could not be modified
to allow the plaintiff to take breaks when needed.225 The court noted that the
employer presented no evidence that indicated the employees had to complete
221. See, e.g., EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 148–49 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating
that eliminating the plaintiff’s medication dispensing duties after plaintiff tried to commit suicide by overdosing on medications would alter the nature of the position in a
way that would cause an undue hardship but also holding that the claim could have
been dismissed for other reasons); O’Bryan v. State ex. rel. Dep’t. of Conservation &
Nat. Res., No 3:04–CV–00482–RAM, 2006 WL 2711550, at *4 (D. Nev. Sept. 21,
2006) (holding that requiring the employer to hire and compensate two employees to
perform one job when the plaintiff’s injury made it impossible for her to fulfill her main
job duty of filing would be unreasonable and cause an undue hardship, but the court
did not dismiss the claim because the employer did not consider whether it would have
been an undue hardship to transfer the plaintiff); Wiggins v. Davita Tidewater, LLC,
451 F. Supp. 2d 789, 798–99 (E.D. Va. 2006) (holding that the plaintiff was not disabled, but even if she was, her requested accommodation of avoiding all supervision that
was critical or caused her stress was not reasonable and would impose an undue hardship on the employer); Mertes v. Westfield Ford, 220 F. Supp. 2d 904, 909–10 (N.D.
Ill. 2002) (holding that plaintiff’s proposed accommodation of having his coworkers
perform all of the tasks on his behalf that involved lifting more than ten pounds or
repetitive arm motions would have caused an undue hardship but also holding that the
plaintiff was not disabled).
222. Only one case in this category (out of twenty-two) involved an outright win
for the plaintiff. In Tobin v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 553 F.3d 121 (5th Cir.
2009), the court affirmed the jury verdict for the plaintiff on his failure to accommodate
claim. Id. at 124. The plaintiff was terminated from his job as a sales representative
selling insurance policies after he had difficulty meeting his quotas due to his bipolar
disorder. Id. at 125. His requested accommodation was “to assign[] him to manage a
‘Mass Marketing’ account, . . . [which] is a group insurance program offered to businesses . . . in which employees [can] purchase insurance policies at a discount.” Id. at
127. These accounts are valuable because the representative gets to meet with many
potential clients at once, thereby making it easier for someone, like the plaintiff, whose
disability makes it difficult for him to stay on track with several smaller clients. Id. at
127. The court affirmed the jury verdict, stating that the jury had the opportunity to
consider the employer’s undue hardship argument for refusing to assign the plaintiff to
one of these accounts and ultimately disagreed with it. Id. at 140–41.
223. 679 F. Supp. 2d 109, 117 (D. Me. 2010).
224. Id. at 130.
225. Id.
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tasks within a specific time limit; therefore, the court held that there was a fact
issue as to whether the plaintiff should have been given more time to complete
some of the more strenuous tasks, which would have accounted for breaks to
accommodate his tolerance level.226 Thus, there was a question of fact with
respect to the undue hardship argument.227
Similarly, in Hill v. Clayton County School District, the court reversed
summary judgment for the defendant.228 The plaintiff was a bus driver for
special needs students.229 The bus had no air conditioning, which caused the
plaintiff, who had lung disease, to have difficulty breathing in the hot Atlanta,
Georgia, weather.230 The school district argued that providing her an air-conditioned bus would have caused it an undue hardship because it would upset
its seniority system with respect to bus allocation.231 The court held that the
school district did not provide any evidence to support its assertion of undue
hardship.232
In Jernigan v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC, the plaintiff was a
service technician whose job duties included installing, repairing, and testing
phone lines, cable, and internet.233 He had an on-the-job back injury that left
him unable to lift more than fifteen pounds or climb poles.234 The court stated
that it was a jury question whether the heavy lifting and climbing duties were
essential functions, given that they comprised a very small percentage of his
duties.235 The court held that, given that plaintiff’s supervisor testified that he
did not believe that accommodating the plaintiff would cause an undue hardship, the employer had not yet presented sufficient concrete evidence to prove
undue burden.236 The court also stated that the purported unfairness of reassigning a minor portion of the duties of a disabled employee to other employees
available to perform such duties does not make the accommodation unreasonable as a matter of law.237
One fairly progressive case is Lovejoy-Wilson v. Noco Motor Fuel, Inc.238
In this case, the plaintiff had epilepsy and experienced seizures daily, which
rendered her unable to drive.239 She worked for one of the defendant’s gasoline
service stations, which was located six blocks from her home.240 She applied
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
Id.
619 Fed. App’x 916, 916 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id. at 917–18.
Id. at 918.
Id. at 922.
17 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2014).
Id.
Id. at 1324.
Id. at 1324–25.
Id. at 1324.
263 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 213.
Id.
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to be promoted to assistant manager, but the employer refused to promote her
because assistant managers had to take their stores’ receipts to the bank for
deposit and the plaintiff could not drive.241 The employer refused all of her
quite reasonable accommodation requests, referred to her letter requesting accommodations as “slanderous,” and threatened legal action.242 The employer
eventually offered her an assistant manager position at a location serviced by
an armored car (thus negating the need to drive to the bank), but it was also in
a bad area of town (and not close to her home).243 The district court held that
this accommodation was a reasonable accommodation, and therefore the employer was not required to do more.244 The appellate court, however, disagreed, stating that “Congress intended that disabled persons have the same opportunities available to them as are available to nondisabled persons.”245 In
response to the employer’s argument that accommodating the plaintiff by allowing her to become assistant manager at her current store would cause an
undue hardship, the court held that the employer had provided no evidence that
the accommodations suggested by the plaintiff would create an undue hardship,
especially in light of the fact that one of the plaintiff’s suggestions was that she
pay for her own transportation to the bank.246
In another appellate case, the plaintiff was a cashier at a Family Dollar
store who suffered from degenerative osteoarthritis of her cervical and lumber
spine, which created pain in her legs and back, making it difficult for her to sit
or stand for long periods of time.247 She requested a stool to sit on as an accommodation, which some of her supervisors allowed but others did not.248
The court held that there was a factual dispute as to whether this accommodation would cause an undue hardship for the employer, stating that the defendant
has not set forth specific facts of an undue hardship.249 The court stated:
While the defendants allege that co-workers had complained about unfair treatment, given Talley’s and other workers’ testimony that she was

241.
242.
243.
244.

Id.
Id. at 213–14.
Id. at 214.
Id. at 217. The district court likely based its decision on the well-known rule
that an employer does not have to provide an employee with her preferred accommodation as long as the employer provides an accommodation that is effective. See cases
cited in Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 47 GA. L. REV. 527, 56, n.222 (2013) [hereinafter Porter, Martinizing].
245. Lovejoy-Wilson, 263 F.3d at 218.
246. Id. at 221 (stating that it will be an uphill battle for the employer to prove that
the accommodation would create any hardship at all).
247. Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 1103 (6th Cir.
2008).
248. Id. at 1103.
249. Id. at 1108.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

27

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 8

148

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

able to perform her job adequately when using the stool, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether this accommodation would
have imposed an “undue hardship” on Family Dollar . . . .250

Other cases where the court held that the defendant had not presented
enough evidence to prove undue hardship at the motion for summary judgment
stage included: Kacher v. Houston Community College System,251 Morse v. Jetblue Airways Corp.,252 Puckett v. Park Place Entertainment, Corp.,253 Rooney
v. Sprague Energy Corp.,254 and Service v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.255
The plaintiffs in the cases below were not as lucky; the courts found that
the defendant had proven the undue hardship defense, and the courts granted
the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.256 For instance, in Dey v. Milwaukee Forge, the plaintiff had work restrictions including bending, lifting,
and repetitive motions after injuring his back at work and having back surgery.257 His employer considered reassignment to another position, but the
250. Id. at 1108–09.
251. 974 F. Supp. 615, 622 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that the employer had not

proven that providing the plaintiff with only classroom teaching duties and not clinical
teaching duties after her liver transplant would be an undue hardship).
252. 941 F. Supp. 2d 274, 301 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that allowing the plaintiff
to work as an inflight supervisor, even though her back injury precluded her from flying, was not an undue hardship because the plaintiff had worked in this job for six
months without being able to fly and that the defendant offered no evidence as to the
statutory undue hardship factors to substantiate its claim that allowing the plaintiff to
work as an in-flight supervisor would have been unduly burdensome, especially given
that other flight attendants were happy to perform her inflight observation duties).
253. No. 3:03–CV–0327–ECRVPC, 2006 WL 696180, at *1, *7 (D. Nev., Mar. 15,
2006) (holding that the employer’s reasons for not allowing the plaintiff (who was a
cocktail waitress) to push a drink cart after her multiple sclerosis precluded her ability
to carry trays did not amount to an undue hardship).
254. 483 F. Supp. 2d 43, 47, 59 (D. Me. 2007) (holding that the employer had not
presented sufficient evidence to prove that accommodating the plaintiff’s macular degeneration by not making him operate large equipment would cause an undue hardship).
255. 153 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1193 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that the employer had
not provided any evidence to demonstrate that providing the plaintiff (who had asthma)
with a smoke-free work environment would have caused an undue hardship).
256. See, e.g., Frumusa v. Zweigle’s, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 2d 176, 191–92 (W.D.N.Y.
2010) (holding that moving the plaintiff’s office to the first floor after an ankle surgery
caused her to be unable to climb steps was an undue hardship because the items needed
for her job, including the filing cabinets and company safe, could not be moved to the
first floor); Mears v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1075, 1080 (S.D. Ga.
1995) (“Requiring a company to employ a person in a particular department while forbidding her supervisor from having any contact with her [because of her emotional
disability] would be an undue burden on the employer. Such a ludicrous notion would
undermine the effectiveness and authority of management. Therefore, the court dismissed plaintiff’s claim.”).
257. 957 F. Supp. 1043, 1047–48 (E.D. Wis. 1996).
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court held that there was no position that could have been modified enough for
the plaintiff to be able to perform the functions.258 The court stated that reallocation of job duties requiring other employees to perform them would cause
those employees to be unable to perform their own duties and would result in
an undue hardship on the employer’s business.259
Similarly, in EEOC v. Eckerd Corp., the plaintiff’s osteoarthritis in her
knees made it difficult for her to walk without a cane or to stand for long periods of time, both of which were required of her job as a cashier for Rite Aid.260
Her doctor requested that she be allowed to sit on a stool for half her shift. 261
Because Rite Aid operated on a lean staffing model, where employees were
expected to stock and clean the store when there were no customers at the register, the court stated that “having a cashier sit idly for half of her shift would
necessarily cause productiv[it]y and morale issues.”262 In response to the
EEOC’s argument that the defendant could absorb the costs of this accommodation because it employs over 80,000 employees with over 4,700 stores, the
court focused on the cost of the accommodation to the particular store where
the plaintiff worked.263 The court stated that the plaintiff’s sitting accommodation was “inconsistent with many of the essential functions of the cashier
position” and would require the employer to pay the plaintiff for twice the
hours that she actually worked while assigning many of her responsibilities to
other employees.264 “As such, the accommodation met the definition of ‘undue
hardship’ under the ADA.”265

D. Structural Norms Cases
By far, the most numerous of all of the undue hardship cases I read were
cases involving modifications to the “structural norms” of the workplace.266
The term “structural norms” refers to the hours, shifts, schedules, attendance
requirements, and leave of absence policies—basically, when and where work
is performed.267 The frequency of these issues is not surprising, given that

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at 1051–52.
Id. at 1053.
No. 1:10–cv–2816–JEC, 2012 WL 2726766, at *1 (N.D. Ga. July 9, 2012).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id.
As mentioned, supra note 17, I read over 120 cases that discussed the undue
hardship defense and fifty-three of them involved accommodations to the structural
norms of the workplace.
267. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Caregiver Conundrum Redux: The Entrenchment of
Structural Norms, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 963, 963 (2014); see also Porter, Backlash,
supra note 8, at 70–71.
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some studies indicate that the most frequently requested accommodation is an
accommodation to one of these structural norms.268
Several cases involved attendance violations. In many of these cases, the
court stated in rather a perfunctory manner that attendance is an essential function of the job and that requiring the employer to accommodate an employee’s
disability-related erratic attendance would cause an undue hardship.269 Therefore, I was surprised to see the court’s unprecedented discussion in this relatively early ADA case. In Dutton, the plaintiff worked as a laborer, truck
driver, and heavy equipment operator, and he suffered from migraine headaches, which led to his termination for absenteeism.270 The plaintiff’s requested accommodation was to allow him to use vacation time for unscheduled
absences due to illness even if he had exhausted his available sick leave.271 The
employer argued that this accommodation would be unreasonable and would
impose an undue hardship on the employer, but the court disagreed and held
that the employer had not proven that the plaintiff’s proposed accommodation
would cause an undue hardship.272 The court reasoned that the employer had
not established that regular and predictable attendance is critical to the plaintiff’s particular job and that the plaintiff had not exceeded his allowed leave
banks.273 Thus, even though the unscheduled absences were disruptive for
managers and other employees, the court held that the employer had not established that the plaintiff’s unscheduled absences were unduly disruptive.274 This
case was surprising to me for several reasons. First, it was unusual for migraine
headaches to have been considered a disability before the ADAAA. Second, it
is fairly uncommon for a court to say that regular and predictable attendance is
not important. And third, most courts would have said that the disruption
caused by plaintiff’s frequent unscheduled absences (which often occurred on
Mondays and Fridays) did cause an undue hardship.

268. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Accommodating Everyone, 47 SETON HALL L. REV.
85, 88 (2016) (citing Lisa Schur et al., Accommodating Employees with and Without
Disabilities, 53 HUM. RES. MGMT. 593, 601 (2014)).
269. See, e.g., Thomas v. Trane, A Bus. of Am. Standard, Inc., 2007 WL 2874776,
at *8 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 2007) (stating that plaintiff’s requested accommodation of a
last minute excused absence whenever he needed time off for his disability would cause
an undue hardship because it could potentially cause the assembly line to back up and
increase overtime hours for other employees called to fill in); Lu Frahm v. Holy Family
Hosp. of Estherville, Inc., No. C95–3011, 1996 WL 33423407, at *6–7 (N.D. Iowa Oct.
30, 1996) (stating that attendance is an essential function of the job and that plaintiff’s
proposed accommodation for flexible scheduling because of her severe migraines
would impose an undue hardship on the employer).
270. Dutton v. Johnson Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 859 F. Supp. 498, 501 (D. Kan.
1994).
271. Id. at 507.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 508.
274. Id.
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In La Porta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., another arguably plaintiff-friendly
case, the court held that the plaintiff’s one-day absence to pursue in vitro fertilization was a reasonable accommodation and that the employer’s undue hardship defense was an issue of fact for the jury.275 The court stated that the employer’s arguments about the lack of substitute personnel and the need for predictable attendance are questions of fact for the jury.276
On the opposite end of the spectrum is Switala v. Schwan’s Sales Enterprise.277 In this case, the plaintiff was a route manager for a frozen food delivery company who was responsible for driving delivery trucks on sale routes
and training other drivers.278 The court held that the employer’s refusal to accommodate one of the plaintiff’s physical therapy appointments after a workrelated injury did not violate the ADA because accommodating this last minute
request would have meant that the delivery route did not get completed, that an
inexperienced driver had to complete the route alone, or that one of two available supervisors would have had to accommodate the trainee on the delivery
run.279 The court held that all of these options would have caused an undue
hardship on the defendants even though the employee was seeking only one
absence as an accommodation.280
As I have discussed elsewhere, it is understandable that an employer
would not want “to continue to employ [someone] who misses an excessive
amount of work.”281 In these situations, employees are usually looking for one
of two accommodations—either the ability to work from home or a leave of
absence in order to recover or get the symptoms of their disability under control.282
Taking the latter first, at least twenty-two of these cases involved leaves
of absence, with the courts regularly holding that an indefinite leave of absence
would cause the employer an undue hardship283 but a leave of absence with a
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

163 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762–63, 768 (W.D. Mich. 2001).
Id. at 768.
231 F. Supp. 2d 672 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
Id. at 676.
Id. at 686.
Id.
See Porter, Backlash, supra note 8, at 76.
Id.
See, e.g., Alston v. Microsoft Corp., 851 F. Supp. 2d 725, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(stating that, even if plaintiff could establish his prima facie case, “requiring [the employer] to extend an indefinite leave of absence is an undue hardship”); Graves v. Finch
Pruyn & Co., Inc., No. 1:03–CV–266, 2009 WL 819380, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27,
2009) (holding that because the employer had offered various leave and light duty accommodations for one year, and because there was “a lack of any prognosis that an
additional two weeks of leave would lead to his reasonable return to work,” an undue
hardship was created for the employer, and therefore the employer was not obligated
to provide additional leave under the ADA); Whitaker v. Wis. Dep’t. of Health Serv.,
No. 13-cv-938, 2016 WL 3693766, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 17, 2016) (holding that plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim failed because continued medical leave was not a
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set return date would not.284 Often, the courts held that there was an issue of
fact regarding whether the leave was indefinite or not; therefore, the courts
would not grant the employers’ motions for summary judgment.285 And some
courts simply held that the defendants had not met their burden of demonstrating that the leave of absence would cause an undue hardship.286 One case made
reasonable accommodation in that “[n]o employer is required to implement an accommodation that would impose an undue hardship” and plaintiff’s leave request amounted
to an open-ended leave, which would have a “substantial impact on the employer’s
operation”); Ventura v. Hanitchak, 719 F. Supp. 2d 132, 140 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding
that it was an undue hardship to require the employer to hold open plaintiff’s position
as an executive assistant beyond the original seventeen weeks of leave, especially because it was uncertain when plaintiff would be able to return and her boss was dealing
with problems caused by untrained, temporary employees); Watkins v. J&S Oil Co.,
Inc., 977 F. Supp. 520, 521–22, 526 (D. Me. 1997) (holding that the employer was not
required to hold open the plaintiff’s job as a station manager while he was recovering
from a heart attack because the plaintiff did not know when he would be able to return
and it caused an undue hardship for the employer to leave the station manager position
vacant).
284. See, e.g., Gibson v. Lafayette Manor, Inc., No. 05-1082, 2007 WL 951473, at
*11 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2007) (rejecting the employer’s argument that the plaintiff’s
leave of absence would cause an undue hardship because the defendant did not present
sufficient evidence that the plaintiff’s leave would have been for an indefinite period
of time); Rogers v. N.Y. Univ., 250 F. Supp. 2d 310, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that
the employer’s undue hardship argument failed because the plaintiff’s leave could not
fairly be characterized as indefinite and whether his six-week leave would cause an
undue hardship was a question of fact for the jury).
285. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Brown & Brown of Lehigh Valley, Inc., 720 F. Supp.
2d 694, 701–02 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (holding that it is a jury question whether plaintiff’s
request for leave was an indefinite amount of leave); Moore v. Md. Dep’t. of Pub.
Safety & Corr. Servs., No. 08–4335, 2011 WL 4101139, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 12, 2011)
(holding that the issue of whether the plaintiff’s eight-month absence from her job to
receive cancer treatment was a reasonable accommodation under the ADA or constituted an indefinite leave of absence that imposed an undue hardship was an issue of
material fact); Shelton v. Bridgestone Metalpha, U.S.A., Inc., No. 3–11–0001, 2012
WL 1609670, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. May 8, 2012) (holding that, because it was unclear
whether plaintiff’s request for leave was indefinite or not, the court could not hold that
the employer carried its burden of demonstrating an undue hardship).
286. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Fed. Express Corp., 83 Fed. App’x 74, 80 (6th Cir.
2003) (stating that there was an issue of fact regarding whether providing plaintiff a
leave of absence would cause an undue hardship); Coffman v. Robert J. Young Co.,
Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 703 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (holding that the defendant did not prove
that providing the plaintiff with an additional unpaid leave of absence would have
caused it an undue hardship, despite the fact that defendant contended that her absence
created a hardship because it had to find a replacement for her); Burress v. City of
Franklin, 809 F. Supp. 2d 795, 814 (M.D. Tenn. 2011) (holding that there was a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether granting additional leave time would have
posed an undue burden on the City); Casteel v. Charter Commc’n Inc., No. C13–5520
RJB, 2014 WL 5421258, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 23, 2014) (stating that there were
issues of fact regarding whether extending plaintiff’s leave would impose an undue
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a point that scholars often make—that it is more efficient to accommodate an
employee’s leave of absence than to deal with the cost of attrition.287 On the
other end of the spectrum, some courts held that what seemed like a relatively
short leave of absence caused an undue hardship.288
Another frequently requested accommodation when an employee’s disability prevents the employee from being physically present at work is to work
from home. Obviously, for some jobs, this is not a feasible accommodation—
particularly in the service, healthcare, or manufacturing industries. When it is
possible, some courts allowed the plaintiff’s claim to go forward, holding that
working from home does not create an undue hardship as a matter of law.289
hardship); Donelson v. Providence Health & Servs., 823 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1190 (E.D.
Wa. 2011) (holding that there was an issue of fact regarding whether additional leave
caused an undue hardship because it interfered with the employer’s goal of providing
its residents with continuous and consistent care or whether the unpaid medical leave
caused no financial harm); Fink v. Printed Circuit Corp., 204 F. Supp. 2d 119, 128 (D.
Mass. 2002) (holding that, because the plaintiff’s duties might make it difficult to find
a temporary replacement, there was an issue of fact as to whether accommodating his
leave of absence request would cause an undue hardship); Harper v. Honda of Am.
Mfg., Inc., No. C–2–97–0338, 1998 WL 1788072, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 1998)
(stating that the undue hardship defense is a fact-intensive, case-by-case determination
so the defendant could not argue that anything more than a twelve-month leave was an
undue hardship); Rascon v. U.S. W. Commc’n, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1335 (10th Cir.
1998) (stating that the employer couold not allege undue hardship for providing a leave
of absence to the plaintiff simply because the plaintiff’s duties had to be covered by his
coworkers); Shim v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 11–00161 JMS–BMK2012 WL
6742529, at *9–10 (D. Ha. Dec. 13, 2012) (holding that there was a material issue of
fact regarding whether plaintiff’s unpaid leave created an undue hardship because there
were questions of fact regarding (1) whether plaintiff was even in violation of the employer’s policy on leaves of absence and (2) whether an additional leave period would
cause an undue hardship).
287. See Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437 (1st Cir. 1998) (rejecting defendant’s
argument on appeal from a jury trial in favor of the plaintiff that giving the plaintiff a
leave of absence caused an undue hardship because a defense witness testified that disability leaves did not financially burden IBM in that it is always more profitable to
allow an employee time to recover than to hire and train a new employee).
288. See, e.g., Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of S.E. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 665, 671
(3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff, who had a mental illness, was not entitled to
continued leave beyond the three months she had already been given because additional
leave would have created an undue hardship, despite the fact that the additional leave
had a set date of return); Pate v. Baker Tanks Gulf S., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 411, 418
(W.D. La. 1999) (holding that plaintiff’s six-week leave of absence caused an undue
hardship on the employer because customers were frustrated with the lack of knowledgeable support from the other staff during the plaintiff’s absence).
289. See, e.g., Bisker v. GGS Info. Serv., Inc., No. CIV. 1:CV–07–1465, 2010 WL
2265979, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 2, 2010) (holding that the employer “failed to meet its
burden of demonstrating that the proposed accommodation [to work from home wa]s
unreasonable or impose[d] an undue hardship on its business.”); Meachem v. Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Div., 119 F. Supp. 3d 807, 817–18 (W.D. Tenn. 2015) (holding
that the defendant had not presented sufficient evidence to allow the court to analyze
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Other courts held that a work from home accommodation would cause an undue hardship to the defendant.290
Several cases involved requested modifications of the hours an employee
worked, either requesting fewer hours291 or more flexible hours.292 For instance, in McMillan v. City of New York, the plaintiff had schizophrenia that
was treated with medication.293 He was a case manager for the defendant, doing home visits, processing social assessments, and certifying clients’ Medicaid eligibility.294 The employer had a flex-time policy that allowed employees
to arrive between 9:00-10:15 a.m., but because his medications made him
drowsy, he often arrived to work late—after 11:00 a.m.295 This arrangement
was approved for ten years.296 The employer eventually stopped allowing this
the undue hardship factors and that without more, providing the plaintiff, who was an
attorney, remote access to her files so that she could work from home when complications from her pregnancy put her on bed rest, did not create an undue hardship).
290. See, e.g., Stanley v. Lester M. Prange, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 581, 585 (E.D. Pa.
1998) (stating that the loss in productivity caused by plaintiff, who was a log clerk for
a trucking company, working from home and the additional time it would take for truck
drivers to travel to plaintiff’s residence would be unduly costly to the defendant).
291. See, e.g., Anderson v. Harrison Cty., 639 Fed. App’x 1010, 1015 (5th Cir.
2016) (stating that the plaintiff’s request to work eight hours per day when all other
corrections officers worked twelve-hour shifts caused an undue hardship); Kralik v.
Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 82 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that the employer did not have to grant
the plaintiff’s requested accommodation of not working overtime because doing so
would conflict with the collective bargaining agreement’s seniority rights and would
therefore cause an undue hardship); Zieba v. Showboat Marina Casino P’ship, 361 F.
Supp. 2d 838, 844 (N.D. Ind. 2005) (holding that there are material issues of fact regarding whether plaintiff’s accommodation request for shorter days would cause an
undue hardship); Butka v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 649, 669–70 (N.D.
Ohio 2004) (stating that there was an issue of fact regarding whether allowing the plaintiff, who was a manager at JC Penney, to work part-time would cause an undue hardship); Kinlaw v. Alpha Baking Co., Inc., No. 02 C 1014, 2003 WL 21089042, at *6–7
(N.D. Ill. May 14, 2003) (stating that the employer could not prove that allowing the
plaintiff to work six hours per day instead of ten hours per day would cause an undue
hardship even though the employer argued that this accommodation required the employer to force supervisors to work extra hours); Dropinski v. Douglas Cty., No.
8:00CV313, 2001 WL 1580201, at *6 (D. Neb., Dec. 5, 2001) (holding that accommodating the plaintiff’s inability to work overtime would cause an undue hardship for the
employer); Lamb v. Qualex, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 374, 378 (E.D. Va. 1998) (stating that
allowing the plaintiff to work part time would cause an undue hardship because it would
eliminate an essential function of the job—working full time).
292. See, e.g., Crabill v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 708 F. Supp. 2d 542,
547, 556 (W.D. N.C. 2010) (stating that allowing the plaintiff, who was a school guidance counselor, to have a flexible work schedule would create an undue hardship), aff’d
in part, vacated in part, and remanded to 423 Fed. App’x 314 (4th Cir. 2011).
293. 711 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2013).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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arrangement, claiming that it could not work because there was not a supervisor
present after 6:00 p.m.297 The plaintiff’s suggested accommodation was to
work through lunch and work late in order to bank time to make up for the late
arrivals.298 In response to the employer’s alleged undue hardship defense, the
court noted that the employer already had a policy of allowing employees to
bank hours if they worked more than seven hours per day and to apply those
banked hours against approved late arrivals.299 There was no evidence that preapproving the plaintiff’s late arrivals would cause an undue burden.300 Although the court noted that the district court correctly concluded that assigning
a supervisor past 6:00 p.m. would be an undue burden, the plaintiff was often
unsupervised when he made home visits or when he had worked late in the
past; so, there was not sufficient evidence of this arrangement causing an undue
hardship.301 Finally, the employer argued that its collective bargaining agreement precluded allowing employees to work through lunch unless they received advance approval.302 But the court disagreed with the employer that the
advanced approval mechanism would cause an undue hardship, stating that this
pre-approval process would not cause “significant difficulty or expense.”303
In a similar case, Ward v. Massachusetts Health Research Institute, Inc.,
the plaintiff requested a flexible schedule as a reasonable accommodation for
his arthritis.304 The court stated that the defendant needed to produce evidence
demonstrating that a flexible schedule would cause a hardship—financial or
otherwise.305 The only evidence the employer presented was that it would be
burdensome to require the plaintiff’s supervisor to match his schedule, but the
court had already found that there was a factual dispute as to whether the plaintiff needed constant supervision to perform the functions of the job.306
The final structural norm that frequently arises in accommodation cases
is a request to change the shift that the employee is scheduled to work. This is
especially true when the employee is scheduled to work night shifts or rotating
shifts.307 For instance, in Grubb v. Southwest Airlines, the plaintiff, who was
a flight instructor for the defendant, had sleep apnea and therefore requested
afternoon-only shifts.308 The employer’s witnesses testified that the accommodation would impose inordinate burdens on other employees and require the
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id. at 124.
Id. at 127–28.
Id. at 128.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
209 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 2000).
Id. at 37.
Id.
See generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, Special Treatment Stigma After the
ADA Amendments Act, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 213, 243–47 (2016) [hereinafter Porter,
Stigma] (discussing some of these cases).
308. 296 Fed. App’x 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2008).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

35

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 8

156

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

employer to fundamentally alter its schedules; the court agreed and held that
the accommodation would cause an undue hardship and was not required.309
In prior work, I noted that most courts that had decided the issue of
whether rotating shifts were an essential function of the job held that they
were.310 Therefore, Holt v. Olmsted Township Board of Trustees311 was a surprising case to me. It was surprising because the court held that allowing the
plaintiff, who was a civilian dispatcher for a police department, to work straight
shifts instead of rotating shifts was a reasonable accommodation.312 The employer argued that this accommodation would impose an undue hardship because it would make other employees work the less desirable shift more often.313 The court held that this argument was just “employee grumbling” and
did not rise to the level of undue hardship.314 Moreover, the defendant had not
presented any evidence that it would incur financial stain or difficulties in staffing if the shift change was instituted.315

IV. THREE NOTABLE TRENDS
As I was reviewing this body of cases, I was struck by the recurrence of
three themes that were repeated over and over again in the cases. The first
theme I noticed is that courts frequently struggled with differentiating between
reasonable accommodations and the undue hardship defense. In other words,
they held that some accommodations caused an undue hardship even when they
did not meet the traditional undue hardship factors but rather seemed unreasonable for some factor other than cost.316 To be clear, it is not just courts that
are confused—scholars also debate the meaning of the reasonable accommodation requirement and its relationship to the undue hardship defense.317

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 388.
Porter, Stigma, supra note 307, at 243.
43 F. Supp. 2d 812 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
Id. at 815, 823–24.
Id. at 823.
Id. at 824. In a similar case, the court held that accommodating the plaintiff’s
day shift request to accommodate his psychiatric disability would not result in an undue
hardship simply because other employees complained about the shift. Vera v. Williams
Hosp. Grp., Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 161, 168–69 (D.P.R. 1999).
315. Holt, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 825.
316. See, e.g., Arneson v. Sullivan, 946 F.2d 90, 92 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that an
unreasonable accommodation is one that causes an undue hardship).
317. Compare Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship,
62 FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1148 (2010) (arguing that reasonable accommodations and undue hardship are flip sides of the same coin) with Porter, Martinizing, supra note 244,
at 545–46 (arguing that “reasonable accommodation” has meaning and substance aside
from whether or not it causes an undue hardship).
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I also noted two other trends when exploring the undue hardship cases.
Perhaps not surprisingly, both of these were concepts I had explored before.318
First, a relatively large number of cases dealt with a concept I have identified
as “special treatment stigma.”319 As I will elaborate on below, special treatment stigma refers to the resentment of coworkers when accommodations
given to employees with disabilities either place burdens on nondisabled
coworkers or are accommodations that those nondisabled coworkers covet.320
Special treatment stigma also manifests in courts often being reluctant to require employers to provide accommodations that place burdens on other employees, concluding that those accommodations create an undue hardship for
the employer.
Finally, the third trend I noticed in the cases was the prevalence of a phenomenon I have called “withdrawn accommodations.”321 Withdrawn accommodations refers to the situation where an employer has provided an accommodation to an employee with a disability but, after a period of time, the employer takes the accommodation away.322 This happens either because the employer thought the accommodation was temporary and then realizes the employee will need it permanently or because a new supervisor comes onto the
scene and disagrees with an accommodation that was previously provided.323
Several of the undue hardship cases tackled this issue.

A. Unreasonable Accommodation or Undue Hardship?
As noted above, the most prominent theme in the undue hardship cases
was the confusion over the meaning of the undue hardship defense in relation
to the reasonable accommodation provision. Recall the statutory language,
which defines discrimination to include
not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who
is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate
318. This is not surprising because we are more likely to notice things that we are
already familiar with. This is called the “availability heuristic.” See Kendra Cherry,
How the Availability Heuristic Affects Decision-Making, VERYWELLMIND (Sept. 10,
2018), https://www.verywellmind.com/availability-heuristic-2794824. For instance, if
you are shopping for a new car, and looking at one particular model, you are much
more likely to notice that model of car on the roads than you were before you had
considered it.
319. See generally Porter, Stigma, supra note 307, at 217. I first coined this phrase
in Nicole Buonocore Porter, Why Care About Caregivers? Using Communitarian Theory to Justify Protection of “Real” Workers, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 355, 359 (2010).
320. Porter, Stigma, supra note 307, at 233–34.
321. See generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, Withdrawn Accommodations, 63
DRAKE L. REV. 885 (2015) [hereinafter Porter, Withdrawn].
322. Id. at 890.
323. Id. at 890 n.29.
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that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity . . . . 324

Courts are often confused about whether the reasonable accommodation
and undue hardship provisions are simply two sides of the same coin (i.e., an
unreasonable accommodation is also an undue hardship) or whether they are
separate inquiries (i.e., an accommodation can be unreasonable even if it does
not cause an undue hardship).
This confusion is perhaps most evident in early disability discrimination
cases. In one of the cases brought under the Rehabilitation Act, the court appeared to conflate the reasonable accommodation inquiry with the undue hardship defense.325 In this case, the plaintiff, who suffered from dyslexia that severely affected his ability to read, applied to work as a firefighter at West
Point.326 Because he could not read from the firefighters’ manual as part of his
physical examination, he was rejected.327 In determining whether there was an
accommodation that would allow the plaintiff to safely perform his duties as a
firefighter despite his inability to read, the court listed the undue hardship factors.328 It then immediately stated:
If, after exploring these criteria, the finder of fact believes by a preponderance of the evidence that accommodating [the plaintiff] would endanger the health or safety of the fire fighters at West Point, then such
accommodation is unreasonable, and the Secretary would have shown
that the West Point fire fighting force did not illegally discriminate
against [the plaintiff] because of his handicap.329

In determining whether there was a reasonable accommodation that
would allow the plaintiff to perform the duties of a firefighter, the court cited
to the undue hardship factors and then immediately concluded that there was
no accommodation that was reasonable.330 In other words, to this court, reasonable accommodation and undue hardship were simply facets of the same
inquiry.
In another early ADA case, the plaintiff suffered from stress and depression and was diagnosed with Dythmia and agoraphobia after being moved from
one department to another.331 The plaintiff’s requested accommodation was to
be allowed to remain in her department without having any contact with her

324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2018) (emphasis added).
See DiPompo v. W. Point Military Acad., 708 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Id. at 542.
Id.
Id. at 550.
Id.
Id.
Mears v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (S.D. Ga.

1995).
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supervisor.332 The court stated that this was not a “reasonable accommodation”
and then defined reasonable accommodation as one that “does not impose an
undue hardship on the employer.”333 Not surprisingly, the court held that requiring an employer to employ a person in a particular department “while forbidding her supervisor from having any contact with her would be an undue
burden on the employer. Such a ludicrous notion would undermine the effectiveness and authority of management.”334 Thus, the court held that the
“[p]laintiff failed to request a ‘reasonable accommodation’ during her employment.”335
Other courts seem to conflate the reasonable accommodation inquiry and
the undue hardship defense without much discussion at all. For instance, in
Dropinski v. Douglas County, the plaintiff was an automotive equipment operator and was responsible for road maintenance.336 After he fell at work and
injured his back, he could only return to work with restrictions of no heavy
lifting and no overtime.337 The employer would not allow him to return and
instead offered to hold open his job for one year with the hope that he would
recover.338 In discussing the possible accommodations that would allow him
to drive the trucks without any heavy lifting and to avoid overtime, the court
held that these accommodations would amount to a restructuring of the job.339
The court then summarily stated: “A restructuring of the job would place an
undue burden on Douglas County. Thus, Dropinski’s requested accommodations were unreasonable as a matter of law.”340
Similarly, in Stanley v. Lester M. Prange, Inc., the plaintiff was a log clerk
for a trucking company whose disability, a back injury, caused her to request a
work-from-home accommodation, whereby the truck drivers would have to
travel to her home so that she could review their logs.341 In discussing why a
work-from-home accommodation was not required, the court conflated the reasonable accommodation inquiry and undue hardship defense.342 The court
stated that, based on the fact that there were safety concerns with the drivers
parking their trucks by her home, “it would certainly be unreasonable and
would cause an undue hardship on the [d]efendant to allow the [p]laintiff to
work at home.”343 The court never discussed any cost issues at all—this is

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Id. at 1080.
Id.
Id.
Id.
No. 8:00CV313, 2001 WL 1580201 (D. Neb. Dec. 5, 2001).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
25 F. Supp. 2d 581, 582–83 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
See id. at 583–84.
Id. at 585.
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another case where the court simply should have held that the accommodation
was unreasonable.344
In another case, Lamb v. Qualex, Inc., the plaintiff was seeking a parttime schedule as a reasonable accommodation for his disability.345 Even
though a “modified schedule” is listed in the statute as a possible reasonable
accommodation,346 courts often hold (erroneously, in my opinion)347 that a request for a part-time schedule is a request to create a new position rather than
to modify the hours of the current position.348 The court in Lamb used the same
analysis, stating, “The ADA does not require that an employer create a position
to accommodate a disabled employee.”349 The court also stated that the ADA
does not “require an employer to accommodate an employee when that accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer.”350 Nothing surprising there. But then the court stated that an “accommodation imposes an
undue hardship if it requires elimination of an essential duty of the position in
question.”351 This is a strange statement because normally courts hold that the
elimination of an essential function of the job makes the accommodation not
reasonable—not that it causes an undue hardship.352 And in fact, there is little
344. See id. 583–85. In a similar case, the court held that allowing the plaintiff to
have one day off to attend physical therapy for his disability would have meant that he
could not perform his job as a sales manager, which required him to ride along with
delivery driver trainees on delivery routes. Switala v. Schwan’s Sales Enter., 231 F.
Supp. 2d 672, 677 (N.D. Ohio 2002). Accommodating his request for the day off would
have meant that either the delivery route did not get completed, an inexperienced driver
was sent alone, or his supervisor would have had to perform his job for him. Id. The
court stated that “plaintiff’s last-minute request for leave was unreasonable, and accommodating it . . . would have worked an undue hardship on defendants.” Id. at 686.
345. 28 F. Supp. 2d 374, 378 (E.D. Va. 1998).
346. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2018).
347. Porter, Backlash, supra note 8, at 79; see also Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing
the Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 3, 62 (2005).
348. See, e.g., White v. Standard Ins. Co., 529 Fed. App’x 547, 550 (6th Cir. 2013);
Meinen v. Godfrey Brake Serv. & Supply, Inc., No. CIV. 10-5077-JLV, 2012 WL
1038676 (D.S.D. Mar. 26, 2012).
349. Lamb, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 378.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. See, e.g., Mason v. Avaya Commc’ns, 357 F.3d 1114, 1122–24 (10th Cir.
2004) (stating that working at home is unreasonable if it requires the elimination of an
essential function); Lopez v. Tyler Refrigeration Corp., No. 99-10637, 2000 WL
122387, at *3 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2000) (holding that it was unreasonable to accommodate
an employee who could not perform the essential functions of his job); Blackard v.
Livingston Parish Sewer Dist., No. 12–704–SDD–RLB, 2014 WL 199629, at *8 (M.D.
La. Jan. 15, 2014) (finding that the elimination of an essential function is not a reasonable accommodation); Bogner v. Wackenhut Corp., No. 05-CV-6171, 2008 WL 84590,
at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2008) (holding that because rotating shifts were an essential
function of the job, it was unreasonable to allow the plaintiff to avoid working rotating
shifts as an accommodation). See generally BEFORT & PORTER, supra note 14, at 165.
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to no discussion of the costs of providing the plaintiff with a part-time schedule,
which is the focus of the undue hardship defense.
Similarly, in Terrazas v. Medlantic Healthcare Group, Inc., after the
plaintiff had back surgery, he had several physical restrictions that precluded
him from performing his job.353 The employer did not reassign him to another
position but instead placed him on leave.354 When the court was discussing his
failure to accommodate claim, it stated that, because he had previously been
removed from one of the positions to which he was applying due to performance problems, “it would have constituted an undue hardship to require [the
employer] to reassign Mr. Terrazas to that position as an accommodation for
his disability.”355 The court also stated that “because the plaintiff [could not]
seriously contest his inability to perform the essential functions of the front
desk position irrespective of his physical disability, any accommodation the
[employer] would have had to make to tailor that job’s duties to the plaintiff’s
abilities would have constituted an undue hardship.”356 Again, this case conflates the reasonable accommodation provision and undue hardship defense by
holding that an accommodation that is unreasonable necessarily causes an undue hardship.
Many of these are older cases, where it makes some sense that the parties
and courts are confused about the relationship between the reasonable accommodation provision and the undue hardship defense. But even in some more
recent cases the court’s analysis revealed confusion. For instance, in Jernigan
v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC, the plaintiff was working as a service
technician when he injured his back on the job, which led to restrictions of not
being able to lift more than fifteen pounds and no climbing.357 He was given
light duty accommodations until it was determined that his injury was permanent, and then the employer refused to accommodate him.358 The court’s analysis turned on whether there was a reasonable accommodation that would allow the plaintiff to perform the duties of the technician position despite his
limitations on heavy lifting and climbing.359 The accommodation contemplated was a manual override, or “helper tickets,” which were routinely used
to have technicians dispatched “to assist other technicians in performing duties
that were either technically or physically difficult for whatever reason for an
employee to perform.”360 The employer argued that allowing the plaintiff to
use this manual override system to avoid the heavy lifting and climbing duties
would cause an undue hardship.361 The court stated that the employer had not
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

45 F. Supp. 2d 46, 48–49 (D.D.C. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 53.
Id.
17 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2014).
Id. at 1321.
Id at 1323–24.
Id. at 1324.
Id.
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yet proven as a matter of law that this accommodation would impose an undue
hardship and then stated that “the purported ‘unfairness’ of accommodations
entailing reassignment of a minor portion of the duties of a disabled employee
where many employees are available to perform such duties does not as a matter of law mean that the accommodation is per se unreasonable.”362 Again, this
case reveals the court’s confusion about the relationship between the reasonable accommodation provision and the undue hardship defense.
Arguably, this confusion should have been cleared up by the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett.363 In this case, the
Court was called upon to resolve the conflict between a disabled employee’s
right to reassignment to a vacant position as an accommodation and the superior seniority rights of other employees who also sought reassignment to the
vacant position.364 In doing so, the Court had to address the relationship between the reasonable accommodation provision and the undue hardship defense. The plaintiff had argued that the seniority system had nothing to do with
whether the accommodation was reasonable; rather, it should only come up as
part of the undue hardship analysis.365 Otherwise, reasonable accommodation
and undue hardship would be “virtual mirror images—creating redundancy in
the statute.”366 The Court disagreed with the plaintiff, stating that the statute
refers to the “undue hardship on the operation of the business.”367 And yet a
demand for an effective accommodation could prove unreasonable because of its impact, not on business operations, but on fellow employees—say, because it will lead to . . . modification of employee benefits
to which an employer, looking at the matter from the perspective of the
business itself, may be relatively indifferent. 368

The Court also discussed the burdens of proof for these issues. The plaintiff
must show that the accommodation seems “reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases.”369 And then the employer must show case-specific

362. Id. A similar issue was discussed in Mertes v. Westfield Ford, 220 F. Supp.
2d 904 (N.D. Ill. 2002). The plaintiff argued that he would be qualified to work as a
technician if the employer directed his coworkers to perform tasks that involved heavy
lifting. Id. at 909. The court stated that requiring that would have been so disruptive
to other employees that it would have been unreasonable and that “it is well established
that an accommodation that imposes an ‘undue hardship’ on an employer’s business
operation need not be made.” Id. at 910.
363. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
364. Id. at 393–94.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 400.
367. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2018)).
368. Id. at 400–01.
369. Id. at 401 (italics omitted).
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circumstances to demonstrate an undue hardship under the particular circumstances.370
Thus, my reading of this case is that the Court disagreed with the idea that
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are simply two sides of the
same coin. Yet, as we saw above in the discussion of the Jernigan case,371
some courts still appear to conflate reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. Furthermore, at least one highly regarded disability law scholar also believes that reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are flip sides of the
same coin. In his article, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship,
Professor Mark Weber argued that reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are two sides of the same coin.372 Specifically, relying on the “ADA’s
text, its history, its agency interpretation, and its social context,” Weber argued
that
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are a single concept.
The words form parts of a statutory sentence that links them together
into the same statutory term. The duty to make reasonable accommodations exists up to the limit of undue hardship. At the point of undue
hardship, the accommodation is no longer reasonable . . . . If “unreasonable accommodation” seems not to make sense, it is because reasonable accommodation lacks a meaning other than the absence of undue
hardship. The terms should be read together, and the opposite of the
one is the other. Hence the play on words to make the title of this article: There is no such thing as unreasonable accommodation or due hardship.373

Although Weber’s article made convincing arguments, I am ultimately
not persuaded. In my article, Martinizing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, I argued that reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are
not two sides of the same coin.374 Instead, I argued that “there is some limitation to an employer’s obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation besides the undue hardship limit. In other words, some accommodations are ‘unreasonable’ even though they do not cause an undue hardship to the employer.”375 Some examples that I identified include: (1) requiring an employer
to create a position for a disabled employee; (2) requiring an employer to allow
a disabled employee to bump another employee out of his job; (3) requiring an
employer to promote an employee with a disability; (4) requiring an employer
to provide an accommodation that is of a personal nature, such as medication
or assistive devices like eyeglasses or hearing aids that the employee uses in

370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

Id. at 402.
See supra notes 357–62 and accompanying text.
Weber, supra note 317, at 1124.
Id. at 1148.
Porter, Martinizing, supra note 244, at 543–58.
Id. at 545 (alteration in original).
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his personal life; and (5) requiring an employer to monitor an employee’s medication or health condition.376 These examples are ones that are always held to
be unreasonable. Similarly, there are some accommodations that are sometimes deemed unreasonable. For example, some courts have held that providing assistance with transportation to work is unreasonable.377 Similarly, some
courts have held that a work-from-home accommodation is unreasonable.378
The point of this discussion is not to argue that I am right and Weber is
wrong (although I do believe that).379 The point is to explain that the confusion
in the cases is not that surprising even though I think it might be frustrating to
litigants, their lawyers, and the courts. And I think it is heartening that most of
the cases I have identified in this Section are early cases, decided shortly after
the ADA was passed and before the Court’s decision in Barnett. It indicates
that we are hopefully on the right track.

B. Special Treatment Stigma
The second trend I noticed in the undue hardship cases was a significant
number of cases describing what I have termed “special treatment stigma.” As
described above, special treatment stigma arises when nondisabled coworkers
are resentful of an accommodation needed by an employee with a disability
either because it does (or is perceived to) place burdens on other employees or
because it is an accommodation that other employees covet.380 Employers are
aware of this resentment (and sometimes believe the resentment is or will be
worse than it actually is) and this (along with the actual or perceived costs of
accommodations) causes employers to be less willing to hire or promote employees who will need accommodations (seen as “special treatment”) in the
workplace.381 A significant portion of the undue hardship cases revealed that
burdens on coworkers were a significant concern of both employers and the
courts.
Before a discussion of the cases, it is important to remember that the four
statutory factors of undue hardship do not explicitly mention the effect on other
employees.382 Only the EEOC regulations suggest that “the impact on the ability of other employees to perform their duties and the impact on the facility’s
ability to conduct business” is an additional factor that should be considered in
the undue hardship analysis.383 Courts often cite to this EEOC regulation when
376.
377.
378.
379.

Id. at 546–47.
Id. at 547–49.
Id. at 549–51.
To be clear, our point of disagreement is pretty minor. As I argued in the
Martinizing article, our differing analyses will nevertheless most often lead to the same
result. Id. at 531.
380. Porter, Stigma, supra note 307, at 236–37.
381. Id. at 235–36.
382. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2018).
383. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v) (2014).
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holding that an accommodation does not have to be granted because of burdens
it may place on other employees.
For instance, in an early ADA case, Dey v. Milwaukee Forge, the court
discussed the employer’s undue hardship defense.384 It first noted that an “accommodation that would result in other employees having to work harder or
longer is not required under the ADA.”385 The court then stated that requiring
other workers to assist the plaintiff would involve a reallocation of some job
duties, which would affect the ability of other employees to do their jobs.386
Thus, the court declared, “Such an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the defendant and is not required under the ADA.”387
In Mertes v. Westfield Ford, the plaintiff argued that he would be qualified to work as a technician if the employer directed his coworkers to perform
tasks that involved heavy lifting.388 The court stated that providing that accommodation would have been so disruptive to other employees that it would
have been unreasonable, and “it is well established that an accommodation that
imposes an ‘undue hardship’ on an employer’s business operation need not be
made.”389 In response to the plaintiff’s argument that it was not uncommon for
certain tasks to be performed by the most qualified technician for that specific
task, the court stated that “splitting certain jobs between technicians with different qualifications is materially different from requiring other technicians to
assist a disabled employee with just about every job.”390
Similarly, in Butka v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., because of the plaintiff’s
psychiatric disability, her doctor recommended she be allowed to temporarily
work part-time in her job as a manager.391 In discussing whether this would
cause an undue hardship, the court discussed that while the employer had temporarily allowed her to work a part-time schedule (tasks that she normally
would have done had to be reassigned to other employees), those employees
would have to complete their own work plus the plaintiff’s duties without any
extra pay.392 The defendant alleged that this “atmosphere contributed to low
morale in the store and to a decline in sales volume as well.”393 Ultimately,
however, the court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the accommodation caused an undue hardship because the employer
did not actually replace the plaintiff for six months after she was fired.394 In
other words, if filling in for the plaintiff’s part-time schedule was really causing
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

957 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Wis. 1996).
Id. at 1052.
Id.
Id.
220 F. Supp. 2d 904, 909–10 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
Id. at 910 (citation omitted).
Id.
359 F. Supp. 2d 649, 665 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
Id. at 669.
Id.
Id. at 669–70.
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the employer an undue hardship, presumably she would have been replaced
sooner.
Other cases have held that an accommodation creates an undue hardship
in part because of the special treatment stigma the accommodation causes. For
instance, in Grubb v. Southwest Airlines, the plaintiff was a flight instructor
with sleep apnea, which caused attendance problems as well as the plaintiff
occasionally sleeping during meetings.395 The accommodation that plaintiff
requested was a set shift assignment.396 The court held that such an accommodation would impose “inordinate burdens on other [Southwest Airlines] employees and require [Southwest Airlines] to ‘fundamentally alter’ its schedules” and was therefore not required.397
In Crabill v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the plaintiff’s
disability led her to request various accommodations for her position as a guidance counselor in defendant’s school district, including “a reduced student
caseload, not carrying heavy materials, and not driving in the dark or on ice or
snow.”398 Some internal employer communications revealed concern over special treatment stigma, specifically regarding placing burdens on other employees.399 At one point, the plaintiff’s manager emailed the human resources department for guidance on how to address plaintiff’s request for a workload reduction, stating that it would be hard to reduce the plaintiff’s workload because
it would just be adding additional work to other counselors.400 Apropos of the
discussion in the above Section, the court’s analysis interchangeably referred
to the plaintiff’s accommodation requests as either unreasonable or causing an
undue hardship. For instance, the court held that reducing the plaintiff’s workload would have shifted these duties to other counselors in the department,
thereby increasing their workload, which the court held would be an unreasonable accommodation.401 But in discussing whether the plaintiff’s request for a
flexible work schedule was reasonable, the court pointed to the fact that any
students who were assigned to the plaintiff while she was absent would lead to
other counselors having to see those students, which would result in an undue
burden.402
Similarly, in EEOC v. Eckerd Corp., the charging party (Strickland) was
a cashier at a RiteAid drug store who was diagnosed with osteoarthritis of both
knees, which “made it difficult for her to walk without the assistance of a cane
or to stand for prolonged periods of time.”403 Accordingly, when she did not
have customers at the register, Strickland would occasionally sit down in a
395.
396.
397.
398.

296 Fed. App’x 383, 385 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 388.
Id.
708 F. Supp. 2d 542, 547–48 (W.D.N.C. 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part
423 F. App’x 314 (4th Cir. 2011).
399. Id. at 548–49.
400. Id. at 551–52.
401. Id. at 556.
402. Id. at 557.
403. No. 1:10–cv–2816–JEC, 2012 WL 2726766, at *1 (N.D. Ga. July 9, 2012).
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lawn chair behind the register.404 The employer was unhappy with this because the cashiers were supposed to “productively work on the sales floor . . .
when they were not helping a customer at the register.”405 Eventually, the employer refused to continue allowing Strickland to sit while working.406
Citing the Dey case discussed above, the court started its undue hardship
discussion with the often-cited statement that “accommodations that result in
other employees having to work harder or longer are often denied on the ground
of undue hardship.”407 Because the RiteAid store operated on a lean staffing
model—where there are generally only one or two cashiers and a manager on
duty, and the cashiers were expected to stock merchandise or clean—“having
a cashier sit idly for half of her shift would necessarily cause productiv[it]y and
morale issues.”408 The EEOC countered that the sitting accommodation was
essentially cost-free and that the defendant could easily absorb the impact
caused by the accommodation because it was a large corporation with over
80,000 employees.409 The court responded that the true cost of the accommodation and its impact should be judged at the store where Strickland worked.410
Allowing Strickland to sit would mean that other employees would have to do
her job duties, and the court held “the accommodation me[t] the definition of
‘undue hardship’ under the ADA.”411
To be clear, not all courts hold that accommodations that cause burdens
on other employees create an undue hardship for the employer. In Holt v.
Olmsted Township Board of Trustees, the court disagreed with the employer
that an accommodation requiring other employees to work a less desirable shift
would result in an undue hardship.412 The court emphasized that “employee
disapproval of a proposed accommodation, in and of itself, does not rise to the
level of undue hardship.”413 Neither does the fact that an accommodation
would force other employees to work an altered schedule.414 The court held
that defendant’s evidence amounted to “employee grumbling,” which did not
rise to the level of an undue hardship.415 Thus, the defendant did not meet its
burden of establishing an undue hardship.416

404.
405.
406.
407.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *9 (citing Dey v. Milwaukee Forge, 957 F. Supp. 1043, 1052 (E.D. Wis.

1996)).
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *10.
43 F. Supp. 2d 812, 823–24 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
Id. at 824.
Id. at 825.
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Similarly, in Morse v. JetBlue Airways Corp., the plaintiff was an inflight
supervisor, whose job included overseeing other flight attendants and supervising them during flights.417 Because of back problems, the plaintiff’s doctor
told her that she was unable to fly.418 The employer at first accommodated this
restriction by asking other inflight supervisors to perform the “check rides” of
flight attendants who reported to the plaintiff, which did not cause any notable
problems.419 Because the plaintiff could not complete the required recurrent
training due to her no-flying restriction, she was placed on leave and eventually
terminated.420 In discussing whether the employer must allow the plaintiff to
continue working as an in-flight supervisor without requiring her to fly, the
court rejected the employer’s undue hardship defense, stating that [the employer] “ha[d] offered no detailed evidence as to the statutory factors to substantiate that allowing plaintiff to remain employed in a non-flying capacity
would have been unduly burdensome.”421 In response to the employer’s argument that accommodating plaintiff’s accommodation request would require another inflight supervisor to “perform [the] plaintiff’s inflight observation duties, resulting in additional costs and loss of scheduling continuity,”422 the court
credited the plaintiff’s evidence that other inflight supervisors “gladly took on
inflight duties without resulting scheduling difficulties” and held that the accommodation did not impose an undue burden on the employer.423
Finally, in Rodal v. Anesthesia Group of Onondaga, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the employer because the district court improperly relied
on the burdens placed on other employees by a schedule accommodation when
finding that the employer had proved its undue hardship defense.424 In this
case, the plaintiff-doctor experienced problems related to a metastatic islet cell
tumor—a form of cancer.425 He continued working, but he could not perform
night and weekend shift duty.426 The employer accommodated this for a period
of time but eventually refused to continue the accommodation, leading the
plaintiff to take forced disability leave.427 In discussing whether the requested
accommodation would cause an undue hardship, the court disagreed with the
district court’s conclusion that requiring other physicians to cover the plaintiff’s night and weekend shifts would result in an undue hardship.428 The court
noted that the undue hardship defense is an affirmative defense and that the
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.

941 F. Supp. 2d 274, 278–79 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
Id. at 280–81.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 281–83, 285.
Id. at 301.
Id.
Id. at 301–02.
369 F.3d 113, 115 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 116.
Id.
Id. at 116–17.
Id. at 121.
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employer had never introduced evidence of its financial resources, the costs of
the accommodation, or the impact of those costs on the employer.429 Although
the court recognized that if the plaintiff were relieved from night and weekend
duty, the burden of these “not-insignificant responsibilities would fall on other
doctors,” it concluded that “without concrete information,” it could not hold
that “as a matter of law that the burden was so disproportionately heavy as to
absolve the [employer] from its reasonable accommodation obligations under
the ADA.”430
Most of these cases focused on the burden an accommodation places on
other employees. But another way that special treatment stigma manifests is
when employees are upset or resentful about the accommodation because it is
one they also covet.
An example of this was found in McDonald v. Menino, which involved
two plaintiffs who were physically disabled and fired by the City of Boston for
“failing to comply with Boston’s municipal residency ordinance.”431 One of
the plaintiffs could not comply with the residency requirement because she
lived with family members (who lived outside of Boston) who cared for her
and she could not afford a private nurse.432 The other plaintiff used a wheelchair and could not find accessible housing in Boston.433 The court fairly easily
rejected the employer’s undue hardship defense, noting that the employer did
not specify the hardship it would have endured if forced to grant a waiver of
the residency requirement.434 The court noted that the plaintiffs successfully
performed their jobs for ten years without any accommodation.435 Instead, the
court surmised that the employer “fear[ed] the deleterious precedent that an
exception for these plaintiffs might pose in its efforts to enforce the residency
policy on other employees.”436 Ultimately, it was not decided whether the
problem of enforcing the residency requirement amidst employees who obtain
a waiver of the policy as an accommodation for a disability would cause an
undue hardship because the employer had not yet attempted to enforce its new
residency requirement on a citywide basis.437
Similarly, in Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., the plaintiff had
several disabilities that made it difficult for her to stand or sit for long periods
of time.438 Some of her supervisors had allowed her to bring a stool to work to
use at the cashier station, but others had refused to allow this accommodation,

429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.

Id. at 122.
Id. at 122.
No. 96–10825–RGS, 1997 WL 106955, at *1 (D. Mass., Jan. 3, 1997).
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Id. at *4.
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asserting that “other employees had complained that [the plaintiff] was receiving unfair treatment.”439 Without this accommodation, the plaintiff was unable
to perform her position and was forced to go on leave.440 When addressing the
employer’s assertion of the undue hardship defense, the court stated:
The defendants have not set forth specific facts indisputably demonstrating that the use of a stool would have presented an undue hardship
for the company. While the defendants allege that other co-workers had
complained about unfair treatment, given [the plaintiff’s] and other
workers’ testimony that she was able to perform her job adequately
when using the stool, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether this accommodation would have imposed an ‘undue hardship’
on Family Dollar . . . .441

Another case addressing this same resentment is Vera v. Williams Hospitality Group, Inc., where the plaintiff requested to be placed on the day shift to
accommodate her disability.442 The employer alleged that changing the plaintiff’s shift would cause an undue hardship—specifically, that other employees
who had more seniority than the plaintiff were upset by the fact that the plaintiff
had been given a day shift at one point.443 The court disagreed and held that
there was an issue of fact regarding whether accommodating the plaintiff constituted a hardship for the defendant.444 The court stated:
Although [the d]efendants state that employees with more seniority
would have complained over [the p]laintiff being assigned to the day
shift, the extent of such complaints is far from established. Although
employee disapproval does not per se rise to the threshold of undue
hardship, if such protest reaches “chaotic personnel problems,” the accommodation will result in undue hardship.445

A final case addressed this issue indirectly. In Stone v. City of Mount
Vernon, the plaintiff was a firefighter who had an off-duty accident that left
him a paraplegic.446 He asked to be assigned to a light-duty position, but the
employer refused.447 One of the witnesses testified that the employer was con-

439.
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cerned about assigning the plaintiff to a light-duty position permanently because it did not want to have an “overload” of disabled individuals in those
jobs.448 Relevant portions of this witness’ deposition testimony include:
I don’t think there’s a finer young person I ever met than [the plaintiff]
and I think he would be an asset up there. I just envisioned what happens or what would happen down the road. Would we be forced to put
everybody that got hurt there? Would it open the door for individuals
who may already have some sort of a physical—a physical handicap
who are not capable of meeting this standard[?]449

The court disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that the accommodation would cause the employer an undue hardship.450 It stated:
The concern expressed by [the employer] that operations would be hampered if the Department . . . were forced to hire [five to ten] disabled
persons is not material to the present case. Each request for a reasonable
accommodation under the federal disability statutes must be decided on
the basis of the existing circumstances. To the extent that an employer
has needs for a number of persons who have no disability, the number
of employees already on staff who had disabilities would be a material
factor to be considered. The suggestion that hiring [five to ten] disabled
persons would be an undue hardship is not a defense when the employer
has hired none.451

Although the court does not say it as explicitly as it could have, the employer here was worried about special treatment stigma. The employer was
worried that if it gave the light-duty accommodation to the plaintiff, it would
experience a backlash from other employees who desired a similar accommodation.
As is obvious from above, courts are not consistent in how they address
issues of special treatment stigma. Because the ADAAA has expanded the
protected class of individuals with disabilities, we should expect to see more
employees seeking accommodations. This increase in the number of individuals with disabilities seeking accommodations has the possibility to exacerbate
special treatment stigma, as employers struggle to find ways to accommodate
more employees and those accommodations place burdens on other employees.452 But it is also possible that, if providing accommodations becomes the
new normal, employees might become accustomed to accommodating each
other.453 And perhaps more importantly, employers might start restructuring
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
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Id. (first alteration in original).
Id. at 100–01.
Id. at 101.
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Id. at 257–58.
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their workplaces to provide accommodations more easily to all employees who
need them.454

C. Withdrawn Accommodations
The third trend I noticed in the undue hardship cases was what I refer to
as “withdrawn accommodations.” As I stated above, withdrawn accommodations are when an employer has provided an accommodation to an employee
with a disability but, after a period of time, the employer takes it away. This
often happens either because what the employer thought was a temporary accommodation has become permanent or because a new supervisor comes onto
the scene and disagrees with an accommodation that was previously provided.455
As I discussed in other work, which explored whether employers who had
withdrawn previously-provided accommodations violated the ADA, courts
vary on what weight they give to the fact that an employer had previously accommodated a disabled employee.456 Some courts hold that the fact an employer previously offered an accommodation indicates that the accommodation
is reasonable.457 Other courts hold that just because an employer was kind
enough to provide an accommodation on a trial basis does not mean that the
employer should be obligated to continue providing it once the accommodation
becomes permanent or has started to cause a hardship.458
Several of the undue hardship cases I reviewed for this Article tackled
this issue. Because my prior Article discovered that this issue of withdrawn
accommodations was more often decided in favor of employers, I was shocked
that all of the undue hardship cases addressing this issue ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs—denying the employer’s dispositive motions and allowing the plaintiff’s claim to survive to be litigated another day. Perhaps this had something
to do with the fact that the undue hardship argument was not very strong in the
first place. In other words, the employer might have been better off arguing
that the accommodation was simply unreasonable rather than arguing that the
accommodation caused an undue hardship.
For instance, in EEOC. v. Placer ARC,459 the defendant (a non-profit organization that provided programs for individuals with disabilities) hired the
plaintiff, who was deaf, as an instructional aide. Her job requirements “included reading information in client files, creating reports detailing the client’s
behavior, and creating daily reports.”460 The employer provided an American

454.
455.
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458.
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460.

Id. at 258–59.
Porter, Withdrawn, supra note 321, at 890, 890 n.29.
Id. at 896.
Id. at 890–12 (citing cases).
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Sign Language (“ASL”) interpreter for almost every meeting the plaintiff attended.461 Later, the employer transferred the plaintiff to a different location,
where she was only occasionally provided an ASL interpreter and accordingly
was confused and frustrated.462 The plaintiff sent a letter requesting a sign
language interpreter for any meetings as a reasonable accommodation, but it is
unclear from the facts if the request was ever granted.463 Eventually, the plaintiff resigned, claiming that the lack of a sign language interpreter, among other
things, prevented her from doing her job well.464
The employer raised an undue hardship defense and supported it with
submitted declarations, which stated that “a financial hardship [was] posed by
hiring a certified ASL interpreter.”465 In response, the court stated that “the
fact that defendant retained an interpreter for at least some staff meetings from
2005 to 2008 . . . , and hired [another employee] at least in part to serve as an
interpreter, undermine[d] its showing of hardship.”466
Similarly, in Morse v. JetBlue Airways Corp., the plaintiff requested an
accommodation that would allow her to continue as an in-flight supervisor
even though she could no longer fly on planes.467 Among the many factors the
court considered in deciding that the plaintiff’s suggested accommodation did
not cause an undue hardship on the employer, the court noted “the fact that
[the] plaintiff satisfactorily worked for defendant for six months in a non-flying
capacity suggest[ed] that [the] plaintiff’s accommodation request would not
have been unduly burdensome on defendant.”468
In another case, the court was not as explicit about its reasoning but ultimately ruled in favor of the employee on his failure-to-accommodate claim. In
Jernigan v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC, the plaintiff was a service
technician for the defendant-employer when he suffered an on-the-job injury
that resulted in a back impairment restricting his ability to lift more than fifteen
pounds and to climb poles.469 When he returned from leave he was given lightduty accommodations, which entailed the company assigning him his regular
tasks and then “manually overriding or accommodating assignments that required heavy lifting or [pole] climbing.”470 Once supervisors learned that the
plaintiff’s injury would be permanent, the employer withdrew the accommodations, claiming that it was company policy to not accommodate a permanent
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disability.471 Eventually the plaintiff exhausted his leave and was terminated.472 Although the court did not discuss the withdrawn accommodation
explicitly, it did require the employer to actually prove that the previously provided accommodation would cause an undue hardship if given permanently.473
Similarly, in McMillan v. City of New York, the plaintiff was a case manager for his employer and he had schizophrenia, which was treated with medication.474 His morning medications made him drowsy and he often arrived late
to work.475 His tardy arrivals were explicitly or tacitly approved for at least ten
years; however, eventually the plaintiff’s supervisor (at the request of her supervisor) refused to approve any more late arrivals, simply stating that she
“wouldn’t be doing [her] job if [she] continued to approve a lateness every
single day.”476 After this practice was stopped, the plaintiff made several requests for a later start time to avoid being disciplined for tardiness.477 He was
told that it was not possible “because he could not work past 6:00 p.m. without
a supervisor present.”478 His tardiness led to a thirty-day suspension without
pay.479
When analyzing whether on-time arrival was an essential function of his
position, the court initially stated that his suggested accommodation of working
through lunch and working late in order to bank time, and then using this
banked time against future late arrivals, was a plausible accommodation.480
Analyzing the undue hardship issue, the court held that assigning a supervisor
to work past 6:00 p.m. would constitute an undue hardship.481 But the court
noted that the plaintiff “was presumably unsupervised when he made home
visits for his clients or when he worked past 7:00 p.m.” from home.482 It was
unclear whether those hours could be banked.483 The court also noted that even
if he could not bank post-6:00 p.m., he was willing to work though his lunch
and could bank that time.484 The court disagreed with the district court, which
had held that because the collective bargaining agreement had a provision that
precluded employees from working through lunch unless they received advance approval, this accommodation would cause an undue hardship.485 The
court stated that such pre-approval did not strike it as “requiring significant
471.
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473.
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475.
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482.
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difficulty or expense.”486 Thus, the court stated that it could not find as a matter
of law that the plaintiff’s “suggested accommodations would constitute undue
hardships to the [employer].”487 Thus, even though the court did not analyze
this under the rubric of “withdrawn accommodations,” it did seem willing to
consider the past history of the plaintiff being allowed to bank time to make up
for his late arrivals.
Finally, in another case of withdrawn accommodations, the court in Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., held in favor of the plaintiff, reversing
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer-defendant.488 In this case, the plaintiff suffered from degenerative osteoarthritis
of her spine, which caused pain in her legs and back that made it difficult for
her to stand for long periods of time.489 After she fell at work, the pain was so
bad that “she could not stand for more than fifteen minutes without experiencing severe pain.”490 Accordingly, some of her supervisors allowed her to bring
a stool to work to use at her cashier station.491 Eventually the employer withdrew that permission, and because she could no longer perform the tasks of her
position, she was forced to take medical leave.492 Although the court never
explicitly discussed the fact that the accommodation had been previously provided and then withdrawn, the court did rule that the employer had not established the undue hardship defense.493

V. CONCLUSION
The undue hardship defense is an instrumental piece of the reasonable
accommodation puzzle under the ADA. And yet, it has received much less
attention in case law than the other components of the reasonable accommodation analysis, such as determining the essential functions of the job, exploring
whether an accommodation is reasonable, and analyzing whether the employer
engaged in the interactive process. The undue hardship provision has also received very little attention by scholars. After the ADAAA made it much more
likely that cases would proceed to a discussion of the merits—including discussions of reasonable accommodations and the correlating undue hardship defense—it seemed time to give the undue hardship defense a closer look.
What I found was both surprising and unsurprising. It was surprising that,
at first glance, there seemed to be so many undue hardship cases.494 But, upon
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.

Id.
Id. at 128–29.
542 F.3d 1099, 110 (6th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1103.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1110.
As stated earlier, a Westlaw search (as of June 18, 2017) of “ADA /s ‘undue
hardship’” resulted in 1,997 results. See supra note 16.
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closer look, only 120 of them actually discussed the undue hardship provision
at any length, which was still more than I had expected to find. And yet, an
even closer look revealed that only sixteen of them actually involved costs,495
which is the main focus of the statutory language of the ADA’s undue hardship
defense.496 This is because accommodations that are truly expensive are rare,
and the reasons that most employers object to accommodations are because
they appear to interfere with the business or, more likely, because of special
treatment stigma. So, the fact that there were so few cases that actually discussed costs was not surprising.
Finally, the three themes identified in this Article were also not surprising
to me even though I did not begin this project looking for them. Courts and
scholars will continue to be confused by, or to debate, the interrelationship between the reasonable accommodation provision and the undue hardship defense. The reluctance to provide accommodations when those accommodations seem like special treatment will continue to vex employers and courts.
Finally, courts will continue to struggle with how to analyze the situation where
an employer provides an accommodation for a period of time and then takes it
away.
In sum, even though my initial gut reaction that the undue hardship provision played a fairly limited role in determining if and when employers have
to provide accommodations to individuals with disabilities was correct, the instances where it does play a role in the outcome provide crucial insight into the
broader question of when employers are obligated to accommodate individuals
with disabilities.

495. See supra Section III.B.
496. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2018).
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